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Abstract 
Keywords: information security, cost of information security, IT security, security processes, maturity 
model, attack model, optimal security. 
Information security is a common and ever-present concern for both private and public sector 
organizations. Information security protects information from a wide range of threats, risks, and 
vulnerabilities in order to ensure information availability, integrity and confidentiality, and hence business 
continuity. 
This research seeks to use a heuristic-based investigation of the Information Security Maturity Model 
(ISMM), developed by the author, combined with a thorough review of existing models, to suggest 
considerable extensions. This shall merit various applications leading to establish a connective body of 
knowledge and bridge a gap in existing literature and industry regarding the information security 
implementation in light of use of international standards and models. 
The ISMM model is neither based on a specific technology/protocol (e.g. PKI, IPSec, SSL) nor a 
certain system/product (e.g. Firewall, Antivirus, IDS), but rather an engineering approach towards a 
structured and efficient implementation of those technologies. The ISMM is a security-centric model that 
consists of five distinctive and ordered security layers, each of which has its own definition, scope, and 
characteristics. The model reflects the three key security processes (prevention, detection and recovery) 
and captures effects of people (visibility and sophistication) on every layer. It aims essentially to assess 
the maturity of any security implementation of any size and type (i.e. device, system, or environment). 
New extensions of the ISMM work are put forward. Literature review is augmented by introducing a 
new classification of information security models. Additionally, new abstractions are introduced, first: the 
abstraction of security conceptual boundaries, which signifies rational priorities and captures the 
unavoidable interferences between information and physical security in any security context, second: the 
abstraction of ratios of resources utilization (i.e. computational power, energy, memory, and other costs). 
Further extensions include a new attack model that classifies attacks in terms of their impact. This leads to 
a new approach for analyzing attacks and study adversary’s capabilities at different layers of both the 
ISMM and network models in the whole system, as one integrated entity against both single and hybrid 
attacks. As an example of one possible mapping and compatibility of the ISMM with other security-
related models, the ISMM layers are mapped to their pertinent peers in network models (i.e. ISO/OSI and 
TCP/IP), which offers more information about security controls at each layer and its contribution to the 
actual overall security posture. 
The ISMM offers a prompt and structured approach to identify the current security state of small 
communication devices, computing platforms, and large computing environments in a consistent manner. 
A cost-effective realization is achieved through the optimization of IT and security expenditure. 
Therefore, the model assists to minimize deficiencies in security implementation. Also, the identification 
of needs and goals of the following level in the ISMM hierarchy allows a strategic approach proportional 
to allowable resources to take place, as a result, both goals are reached and cost is reduced much faster. 
This work is believed to facilitate grounds for future research endeavors such as applying these 
propositions on simulated examples, real life case studies, and developing a formula for the optimized 
distribution of security resources in a consistent manner with the best possible security level. 
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Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has redefined work design and methodology, greatly 
reducing the time and effort needed to accomplish tasks, and facilitating both line performance and 
management decision-making process. ICT today is regarded as a vital business tool and a job-
performance requirement in many organisations and at various levels within them. 
The cost of information processing and acquisitions has been fundamentally altered by employing 
efficient information and communication systems. Information in the 21st century has become a major 
success factor to the organisations and states. Therefore, securing such a vital asset is a core business 
requirement that needs to be well planned and executed constantly in a structured manner [1]. However, 
information security is always characterized by three fundamental aspects: confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability (shortened as CIA). The application of these three aspects is broadened by including other 
properties such as authentications, non-repudiation, and accountability [2].    
Although IT, and information security in specific, potentate a number of benefits, it also introduces 
special problems and concerns. Information systems do not produce benefits in their own right, but rather 
they are an important tool by which business processes and practices can be improved, resulting in 
business benefits [3]. As a result, ensuring security of information is a determinant factor for success 
utilization of such systems 
1.2 Justification of the Study 
Despite the increasing investment in information security and the strategic role played in today’s 
organisations, understanding how to deliver information security successfully still remains one of the 
challenging issues facing the IT field [4,5,6,7,8,9,10]. In particular, the evaluation and delivery of reliable 
information systems benefits remains problematic and has attracted the attention of several researchers 
[11,12,13]. 
New risk areas that could have a significant impact on business success have uncovered the importance 
of information security and requirements for availability and robustness, examples may include misuse 
and abuse of information systems and external threats such as hackers and viruses. 
Information systems however have come under severe criticism for failing to return value for the 
money invested.  This criticism began in the early 1990s, and it continues to increase [3], failing to secure 
information assets is a main reason for not gaining expected return on investment on IT, which then might 
lead to business failure. 
Several reasons leading to undertaking this research study in the area of information security are 
explained: First, information systems now often have a fully operational role rather than the support role 
of the past. Consequently, the effective work culture and reputation of the organization and its image in 
the eyes of its customers can be immediately influenced by any failure in its systems [14].   
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Second, investments in the ICT industry are large and increasing, and the technology budget is 
attracting more and more attention from top managers who would like to identify and clarify the benefits 
these investments are bringing to their business [15,16,17,7,11,10].   
Third, significant barriers exist to successful implementation of these information and communication 
systems, many organizations have failed, in particular, in determining how to deliver IT systems 
successfully [4,18,5,6,19,9,12].  
Fourth, security is a core requirement of organizations and states that needs to be integrated into 
business processes and culture [20, 1]. Hence, there is an innate need in both academia and industry for a 
structured and comprehensive methodology of information security process, it is required to be integrated 
in nature, assess progression, and provide a measure of the amount of “information security cost” in 
place. 
Fifth, it is anticipated that the revisions and extensions of the Information Security Maturity Model 
(ISMM) [21] presented in this research can lead to a higher rate of success in securing computing 
environments. 
1.3 Study Objectives 
This research explores the area of information security implementation with the purpose of extending the 
ISMM work, which is intended for measuring and evaluating the maturity level of information security 
and its delivery from an integrative, inclusive, and holistic point of view. 
Objectives of study presented in this research can be summarized by the following points: 
• Provides a review of existing published security models and network models 
• Extends the ISMM work in terms of its dimensions (layering, process, and people), 
propositions and dependencies 
• Proposes a consistent abstraction of security boundaries, resources, amount of information 
security cost, and attacks 
• Accordingly, suggests a new definition of optimal security notion from the ISMM model 
perspective 
• Puts forward a new attack model that is consistent with the original ISMM model 
• Shows the ISMM’s compatibility with other security-related models through the use of its 
mapping to network models as one possible example 
• Supports these propositions by an implementation snapshot of typical environment 
• Offers analytical discussion of the ISMM model and its differentiated features as opposed to its 
peers 
• Suggests possible further researches in the area 
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1.4 Research Questions 
There are many aspects in this study that could be part of this section, however, in light of the aim and 
objectives of this study, the primary research questions are as follows: 
• Has this subject been approached in previous studies (if any)? 
• Can the ISMM model be extended to abstract and hence measure security level and amount of 
information security cost? 
• Can this abstraction lead to sensible and coherent information when compared to the result of 
the actual security level on the ISMM? 
• How can attacks be classified in terms of their respective impact on victim’s computing device, 
platform, or environment instead of their origin or behaviors? Is it necessary that similar 
attacks should always have the same impact on different systems? 
• Can layers of the ISMM be mapped to their corresponding layers in network models (i.e. 
ISO/OSI and TCP/IP)? At what layer(s) should security controls be implemented? 
• Can this approach be used to provide consistent comparison of security level of different sizes 
and types of organizations/computing environments? 
• How can this model be different from other maturity models in the industry? What are the 
added values and unique features it offers? 
• Is it possible to derive relative estimates of security resource utilization (i.e. energy, processing 
power, and memory) and link them to their respective ISMM-specific metrics (layers, 
processes, quality, and ISO domains) and security control properties (parameters, risks)? 
• How much is being spent on information security? On what? Are these expenditures justified? 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
Recent literature has confirmed that organisational investment in ICT continues to rise at an astounding 
rate. The literature also identifies a lack of success in achieving benefits from investment in ICT [16].  
The importance of this study to practitioners and researchers is that it intends to bridge the gap between 
theory and practice by examining and evaluating the ISMM model and showing its compatibility with 
existing security-related models by linking it to standard network models as an example. The ISMM 
offers a new abstraction of optimal security notion and corresponding attack model. In this way, it will 
facilitate a new approach for measuring the amount of information security cost in any computing device, 
platform, or environment regardless of its size and type, leading to a more realistic estimate and 
correlation of security control parameters, resource utilization ratios, and the ISMM model metrics. 
Therefore, it facilitates more improvements in level of the maturity of security awareness and practice, as 
organizations seek to improve their ability to successfully compete by adopting and implementing 
recognized security standards and methodologies. 
Researchers will find arguments made in this research are based on literature review of various 
information security and network models. It uses this multi-layer framework to bring heuristic evidence 
and evaluation of which security components and associated processes are essential to the successful 
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implementation and hence business survival, thus, extensions of the ISMM model provide a research 
vehicle of value and use to researchers.  In addition, this research presents findings that will point the way 
to further researches in potentially rich and varied areas related to the information security delivery. 
On the other side, practitioners (such as top managers, information systems executives, strategic 
planners, information security officers/auditors, and others) in their various firms should find this research 
beneficial as they move toward further implementation of information security in their organizations. This 
research intends to assist practitioners by providing an inclusive framework that acknowledges both 
aspects of defense-in-depth and attack-in-depth concepts. Therefore, it offers a reliable progressive 
picture of security posture. 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
This thesis details the reasoning, structure, core deliverables, findings and applications of the ISMM 
model. The thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter one, Introduction, provides a general overview of 
the motivation for the research, following an explanation of the aims, objectives, and significance of the 
research. Chapter two begins literature review, it introduces the problem, information security key 
concepts, subsequently, an extended exposition of the current security standards (i.e. ISO17799), security 
models including the ISMM, and standard network models. Chapter three, Applications of ISMM, 
presents an extended explanation of the ISMM model along with a new definition of optimal security 
notion, followed by a newly derived attack model and one example of its compatibility with other models 
(the mapping to network models), supported by an implementation snapshot and discussion of the ISMM 
differentiated benefits as opposed to other published security models. Chapter four, Conclusion and 
Recommendations, provides a summary of research core deliverables, discusses the implications of the 





If you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it. [22]  
This old saying is perhaps one of the most significant formulas for the information security professional. 
In this area, metrics are essential, be they operational or risk-based. Applying appropriate measurements 
that are consistent and reflect the latest security technology is a mandatory requirement for a successful 
security implementation. Technology never stops, continues to open more opportunities and threats, and 
hence cannot be controlled using outdated techniques. 
Information security is safeguarding money, image, reputation and potential of the enterprise. The 
consequences of security incidents can be disastrous, but they are avoidable. The old physical approach to 
security remains important, but as businesses acquire a new virtual identity, it is not enough anymore. 
Technology cannot provide all answers to problems posed by people. This is because information security 
is not a technical issue but it is rather a business and management issue too. The answer is to adopt 
appropriate methodologies and controls to counter the ever-changing threats facing the organization, and 
to build these behaviours into day-to-day business process, operations, and culture instead of bolting it on 
as an optional duty or onetime project. 
As mentioned in [23], technology is reshaping the economy and the relationships between businesses 
and consumers. The world economy is undergoing fundamental change. Billions of dollars are being 
exchanged at the speed of thought. Companies are now working on a 24/7 basis worldwide. Digital 
commerce is becoming the norm, rather than the exception. In fact, the very idea of a corporate 
headquarters is beginning to become a metaphysical concept, increasingly, the corridors in which 
managers run into each other are increasingly transforming from physical to electronic ones. 
Information is an asset that, like other vital business assets, has value to the organization. It can exist in 
many forms, it can be printed or written on paper, stored electronically, transmitted by post or using 
electronic means, demonstrated in presentation, or spoken in conversation. Regardless of which form it 
may take, it should always be accurately identified, properly handled, and proportionally secured to its 
associated weight and importance of the organization. 
Information security is one of the hottest issues in the current ICT industry, and will remain so into the 
foreseeable future. Information security to a business means having information available to it when it 
needs it, it means being able to trust in the integrity of information, and it is being able to trust that the 
information you receive has not been seen first by others. 
2.2 Key Concepts 
Information may be defined as the characteristics of the output of a 
process, these being informative about the process and the input. [24]  
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This discipline independent definition may be applied to all domains. To name a few, models of 
communication [25], perception, observation, belief, and knowledge are suggested to be consistent with 
this conceptual definition framework of “information” [24]. 
However, information is an asset which, like other important business assets, has a value to the 







The ultimate goal of the information security process is to protect three unique attributes of information 
(sometimes refereed to as CIA triad). These are [2]: 
• Confidentiality: is assurance of data privacy. Ensuring that information is accessible only to 
those authorized and having appropriate access, no one else should be granted that permission 
• Integrity: is assurance of data non-alteration. Safeguarding the accuracy and completeness of 
information, so, measures must be taken to insulate information from any accidental or 
deliberate change to the contents 
• Availability: is assurance that authorized users have reliable access to information and 
associated assets at the time they need it 
These attributes are further augmented to include the following qualities [2]: 
• Accountability is assurance in tracing all activities/actions to a responsible and authorized 
individual or process within a reasonable amount of time and without undue difficulty 
• Non-repudiation: is assurance of delivery and identity between sender and recipient. That is the 
sender of data is provided with proof of delivery, and the recipient is provided with proof of 
sender’s identity 
• Authentication: is the process of verifying the identity of an individual, computer, computer 
program (i.e. process), or similar 
There are various definitions in the literature for information security, each of which tries to bind it 
with certain perspective, sometimes linked to the protection of information assets themselves, others link 
it to Internet and sometimes it is associated with the protection of computer architecture as whole system. 
Information security can be defined as: 
The concepts, techniques, technical measures, and administrative 
measures used to protect information assets from deliberate or 
inadvertent unauthorized acquisition, damage, disclosure, manipulation, 
modification, loss, or use. [26]
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However, others attach information security to Internet communication: 
The ideal state where all information can be communicated across the 
internet secure from unauthorized persons being able to read it and/or 
manipulate it.  [27]
Other definitions link security with computer system’s security:  
Deals with the techniques employed to maintain security within a 
computer system.  [28]
Over the years IT industry has witnessed an explosion of maturity models applied to different arenas 
and various industries. Generally, all maturity models have one thing in common: they work as a process 
reference model capturing the topmost view of the capability under study. 
The Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon University is a leading creator of 
Capability Maturity Models (CMMs) [29]. Three examples from the SEI are the Software CMM (SW-
CMM), the Systems Engineering CMM (SE-CMM), and the CMM Integration (CMMI). However, a 
Capability Maturity Model (CMM) is generally defined as: 
A model for judging the maturity of the…processes of an organization 
and for identifying the key practices that are required to increase the 
maturity of these processes. [29]  
However, SEI CMM is further augmented by incorporating the integrity notion to its original CMM 
and hence referred to as Capability Maturity Model® Integration (CMMI) which is: 
A process improvement approach that provides organizations with the 
essential elements of effective processes. It can be used to guide process 
improvement across a project, a division, or an entire organization. [29] 
Nevertheless, the Capability Maturity Model (CMM) describes an evolutionary improvement path from 
an ad hoc, immature process to a mature and more disciplined process and therefore captures the 
progression against time. 
the idea behind a CMM is to define areas of a project that should have 
processes associated with them (“process areas”) and then to measure 
the application of those processes (“capability level”) in an 
organization. A more “mature” organization is defined as one whose 
processes are better defined and managed. [30]
The researcher argues that most of these definitions reflect notions and terms captured from either 
software or systems engineering, or project management disciplines. These disciplines have one thing in 
common: their models are all established based on a clearly defined development life cycle, which has 
specific start and end time points, progressive stages, and the input and output of each stage is well 
anticipated and defined. This observation almost applies to system, software, and project management 
disciplines. It is worthy noting that information security on the other hand is about continuous process 
once started, and therefore has no established development life cycle and should never have one (i.e. open 
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life cycle). As a result, any maturity model that is designed for information security with such variances 
in mind will be more realistic and applicable in the security field. 
2.3 ISO17799 Standard 
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical 
Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are 
members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical 
committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical activity. 
ISO and IEC technical committees work in partnership in fields of mutual interest. Other international 
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in contact with ISO and IEC, also take part in the 
work. 
International Standard ISO/IEC 17799 was originally prepared by the British Standards Institution 
under the name BS7799, and then adopted by ISO/IEC as ISO17799. ISO17799 is the most widely 
recognized international information security standard. The ISO17799 Standard is mainly intended for 
business managers and their staff to provide a model for planning and managing an effective information 
security management system. Therefore, the decision for adapting the model should be made at the 
strategic level for the organization. Also, the design and implementation of it is influenced by business 
needs and objectives. ISO/IEC 17799 as mentioned in [31] outlines ten distinctive information security 
controls (recently eleven domains, see appendix for more explanations): 
1. Information security policy 
2. Organizational security 
3. Asset classification and control 
4. Personnel security 
5. Physical and environmental security 
6. Communications and operations management 
7. Access Control 
8. System development and maintenance 
9. Business continuity management 
10. Compliance 
2.4 Review of Maslow Work 
Maslow produced the idea that a hierarchy of needs could explain behavior. His theory of individual 
development and motivation was originally published in 1943 [32]. His basic proposition as mentioned in 
[33] is that human needs are arranged in a series of levels, a hierarchy of needs. People want beings, they 
always seek more and more, and what they want depends on what they already have. The connection of 
Maslow’s work and the ISMM is briefed in  3.2.5 (Model Dependencies). 
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Maslow identified a hierarchy shown as ranging through five main levels, they can be defined in the 
following way: 
• Physiological needs, at lowest level: 
These include a wide range of basic human needs that every human body requires in order to stay 
alive and function normally. It includes homeostasis such as home, satisfaction of hunger, sleep, 
and oxygen 
• Safety needs: 
These include safety and security, examples would include freedom from any physical attack or 
harm, and protection from danger 
• Love needs: 
Love or social needs include sense of belonging and social activities, it is about social support 
necessary to life. Examples would include friendship and sharing love with others 
• Esteem needs: 
These include both self-respect (desire for confidence and strength) and esteem of others 
(reputation, status, and recognition) 
• Self-actualization need, at the highest level: 
Self-actualization is about continuous development and realization of one’s full potential 
The degrees of satisfaction in Maslow’s work are described in terms of decreasing percentages of 
satisfaction when moving along levels of the hierarchy. A false impression may be given that a need must 
be fulfilled completely before next level’s needs arise. 
Although Maslow suggests that most people have these basic needs in 
about the order indicated, he also makes it clear that the hierarchy is not 
necessarily a fixed order. [33] 
Maslow stated that these elements in the hierarchy are not to be considered as a rigid framework. There 
might be a number of exceptions to order indicated, a reversal of the hierarchy might apply on some 
people. Self-esteem as example may be seen as more important than love needs for some people. 
However, in [34] Maslow’s hierarchy shows the following properties: 
• A need once satisfied is no longer a motivator, therefore, a need which is being satisfied over a 
period of time may be undervalued. People who have never suffered from thirst may tend to 
undervalue its effects on them, and regard drink as unimportant element for them 
• A need cannot be effective as a motivator until satisfying those before it in the hierarchy 
• If deprived of the source of satisfaction from a lower order need, it will again become a 
motivator 
• There is an innate desire to move up the hierarchy as lower levels become satisfied to a 
considerable extent 
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• Level 5 (self actualization needs) is not like other levels: the opportunities presented cannot be 
exhausted or fulfilled completely 
2.5 Overview of Information Security Implementation 
For organizations to tackle and implement security requirements they generally either assign internal team 
or external expertise (outsourcing). However, outsourced management and monitoring of security systems 
is the fastest growing segment in the information security services market [35]. 
Current security dynamics show that there is a non-stop race between abusers (hackers, crackers and 
criminals) on one side and good guys (security bug busters and law enforcement) on the other side. It is 
very unfortunate that the abusers are always a step or two ahead in the game, leaving the good guys in  
catch-up mode. 
One of the most publicized attacks on computer systems is the computer virus.  However, it is 
becoming an increasing factor that employees, both present and former, are also posing great threats [36]. 
These observations and many others from various researches and surveys stress that any reliable 
security solution we might think of must be integrated and follow a structured approach. Attacks are 
increasingly becoming more sophisticated as both physical and logical attacks (i.e. breaking the physical 
and cyber systems together – say CCTV and communication systems respectively) are no longer 
separated. Therefore, the nature of information security threats has evolved into a more sophisticated 
dilemma which makes the job for security professional much harder. As a result of that, the framework 
that security solutions are being built on must respond to such new synergies and become more 
structured, integrated, and adoptive more than ever. 
Fortunately, various security-conscious standards organizations such as the British Standards Institute, 
or BSI (www.bsi-global.com), and International Standards Organization, or ISO (www.iso.org), have 
undertaken the task of standardizing what we mean by the application of security. 
The first of these standards is BS7799 developed by BSI, which was then adopted by ISO as ISO 
17799. These standards define the spectrum of security controls that can be put into place. They also 
establish criteria for measuring those controls. However, determining the risk that the controls affect and 
the benefit to the organization requires experience and knowledge. There are other standards such as 
"Guidelines for the Management of IT Security” known as (GMITS standard). But ISO 17799 [37,38] has 
become the most widely accepted and recognized. Since so many security standards exist, it is often 
difficult to determine which best fits and applies to an organization. 
A new breed of acronyms and buzzwords is finding its way to the attention of senior management as 
security jumps from nowhere in their attention list to become the top issue in their agendas. Obviously, 
the information security awareness is increasing and as a result of that the value of information is being 
recognized more than ever. But, still the real question is whether or not the pace of this increase is 
proportionate with the dynamics of current security threats and demands. However, this argument calls 
for a sophisticated and robust security system to protect organization assets that have significant impact 
on business operations and its survival. 
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2.6 Current Studies in Information Security Models 
2.6.1 Introduction 
Security and complexity do not usually get along. The highest security is 
usually accomplished with simplistic and elegant solutions to ensure that 
all of the entry points are clearly understood and protected…true 
security is based on education, knowledge, and experience. [39]  
Not all data has the same value to the organization. For the organization to govern the information 
assets, it should know first where the critical data resides and determine the value of different types of 
information before planning on appropriate measures. Because each piece of information may require 
different methods and levels of protection, identifying where each is located enables the organization to 
establish an integrated security solution balanced with its security needs, and hence, provides well-
informed cost-benefits tradeoff of the organization resources. 
The return on investment for any infrastructure is tied to the applications 
that use it, in commerce, government, financial and healthcare 
processes, the potential benefits are substantial. The return on 
investment from the applications it enables is the driver to use it. [40]
However, one key issue here is the correct identification and estimation of information assets. Some 
information might not be perceived as crucial to the organization, but, still could become risky to the 
business and its reputation if it gets into the wrong hands. It is a costly mistake to underestimate the real 
value of information assets and the actual cost of losing it. 
“Most organizations readily acknowledge that strategic plans are 
crucial to the success of a company. But do most companies really make 
an effort to protect these plans?” [20]
It is instantly recognizable that much of the information that is so essential to successful business 
operations could be destructive if it is misused by employees, abused by outsiders, or should fall into the 
wrong hands. The exposure to unauthorized entities or individuals is significantly increased in networked 
environments, and increased drastically more when connecting to the Internet space. The protection 
mechanism must be done holistically and in an integrative way, thus providing the organization with the 
appropriate level of security at a proportionate cost. 
Most models reflect three main processes of security: prevention, detection, and recovery system. 
Responsiveness to emerging security threats represents an innate need for any model in order to be 
adaptive and practical. 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that  
The presence of processes does not guarantee that the outcome of a 
project will be successful. But the presence of processes and the 
adherence to them by the organization should provide some insight into 
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the ability of the organization to accurately predict the outcome and to 
repeat success achieved on earlier projects.  [30] 
However, there have been few security maturity models initiatives, most of them are developed from 
the industry, and unfortunately scarce literature exists in academia. The following sections elaborate on 
key published models. 
2.6.2 SSE-CMM Model 
The International Systems Security Engineering Association (ISSEA, established in 1999) is a non-profit 
membership organization dedicated to the advancement of Systems Security Engineering as a defined and 
measurable discipline [41]. The ISSEA has developed by an industry/government consortium a CMM, 
called the Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model CMM (SSE-CMM). The SSE-CMM 
has been accepted by International Organization for Standardization (ISO) as ISO/IEC 21827 standard 
(ISSEA, Press Release) [42,43]. The SSE-CMM model provides industry best practices guidance without 
being specific as to how security solutions are implemented, therefore, it can be used as a vehicle to 
generate security requirements. It is worth noting that the SSE-CMM adopts similar context of the 
Systems Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SE-CMM). The SSE-CMM defines five capability 
levels (SSE-CMM): 
Maturity Level Description 
Level 1 Base practices are performed informally 
Level 2 Base practices are planned and tracked 
Level 3 Base practices are well defined 
Level 4 Base practices are quantitatively controlled 
Level 5 Base practices are continuously improving 









































Figure  2-1: SSE-CMM Capability Levels [44]
Source: SSE-CMM Model Description Document, Version 3.0 
The SSE-CMM defines eleven security-related Process Areas (PAs) and also includes another eleven 
process areas related to project and organizational practices (these process areas were adopted from the 
SE-CMM). Security-related process areas are defined in alphabetical order to avoid implications of a 
sequence (SSE-CMM): 
PA01 – Administer Security Controls 
PA02 – Assess Impact 
PA03 – Assess Security Risk 
PA04 – Assess Threat 
PA05 – Assess Vulnerability 
PA06 – Build Assurance Argument 
PA07 – Coordinate Security 
PA08 – Monitor Security Posture 
PA09 – Provide Security Input 
PA10 – Specify Security Needs 
PA11 – Verify and Validate Security 
Achieving capability level-1 on SSE-CMM requires 100% fulfillment of best practices predefined for 
this level. All other capability levels are considered achieved if 100% of the previous level and at least 
80% of the current level is achieved [45]. 
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Figure  2-2: SSE-CMM Appraisal Process [45] 
Source: SSE-CMM Appraisal Method (SSAM), Version 2.0 
 
Figure  2-3: SSE-CMM Capability Levels [44] 




SSE-CMM also identifies two types of metrics [43]:  
Process Metrics: Metrics that could be used as a measure of the level of maturity for a specific SSE-
CMM process area. Hence, they tell whether or not a mature process exists. 
Security Metrics: A measure of the efficiency for a particular SSE-CMM process area. They could be 
quantitative or qualitative measures.   
The main difference between these two process metrics is that the first type offers information about 
the behavior of process areas, where the second type tests the output of these process areas [41,43]. 
According to [44], the SSE-CMM® is a model focused on maturity of various security process areas to 
assess security engineering capability in linkage with the other engineering disciplines, as security spans 
over all of those disciplines (e.g., systems, software and hardware). 
2.6.3 COBIT Model 
As part of COBIT® (Control OBjectives for Information and related Technology) initiative [46], the ITGI 
has developed a simple information security governance maturity model, which is meant to enable an 
organization to establish a ranking for the way it manages information security. COBIT maturity model is 
derived from the maturity model that the Software Engineering Institute defined for the maturity of 
software development capability. Figure  2-4 and Table  2-2 depicts various maturity states and generally 
describes requirements at each state respectively [46]. 
COBIT IT processes assume application controls are governed by business process owners and hence 
integrated into business processes, as a result, COBIT cover general IT controls. The maturity levels are 
meant to describe possible states of these IT processes. They are not intended for use as a fulfillment 
model, where fulfilling lower level requirements is an eligibility key to promotion to higher levels. For 
each of the predefined 34 IT processes, COBIT helps management to identify [46]: 
• The actual performance of the enterprise: the current state 
• The current status of the industry: for benchmarking purposes 
• The enterprise’s target for improvement: the desired state 
 
Figure  2-4: COBIT Maturity Model [46] 
Source: COBIT Ver. 4, IT Governance Institute 
Maturity Level Description 
Level 0 – Non-existent The organization does not recognize the need for IT security. There is a 
complete lack of a recognizable system security administration process. 
Level 1 – Initial / Ad hoc The organization recognizes the need for IT security. But, the 
organization considers IT risks in an ad hoc manner, without following 
defined processes or policies. 
Level 2 – Repeatable but intuitive Responsibilities and accountabilities for IT security are assigned to an 
IT security coordinator. There is an emerging understanding that IT 
risks are important and need to be considered. Some approach to risk 
assessment exists, but the process is still immature and developing. 
Level 3 – Defined process Security awareness exists and is promoted by management. An 
organization-wide risk management policy defines when and how to 
conduct risk assessments. Risk assessment follows a defined process 
that is documented and available to all staff through training. 
Level 4 – Managed and 
measurable 
Responsibilities for IT security are clearly assigned, managed and 
enforced. The assessment of risk is a standard procedure and 
exceptions to following the procedure would be noticed by IT 
management. 
Level 5 – Optimized IT security is a joint responsibility of business and IT management and 
is integrated with corporate security business objectives. Risk 
assessment has developed to the stage where a structured, organization-
wide process is enforced, followed regularly and managed well. 
Table  2-2: Levels of COBIT Maturity Model 
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2.6.4 NIST Model 
The Computer Security Resource Center (CSRC) under the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) has developed a security maturity model based on five consecutive levels. The model 
links the maturity at any level with the level of documentation in place, and assumes fulfillment of 
previous level requirements in order to be promoted to higher level (i.e. NIST is a threshold model) [47]. 
The following table provides a brief description of the model details: 
Maturity Level Description 
Level 1: Policies Formal documented and updated policies are 
communicated to all employees. Policies 
establish a continuous risk assessment and 
implementation and cover major facilities and 
operations. Clearly assign roles, 
responsibilities, and measures. 
Level 2: Procedures Formal documented and updated policies cover 
all security controls. Procedures clearly 
identify where, how, when, when and on what 
the procedure to be performed. Procedures 
document controls implementation. 
Level 3: Implementation Procedures are communicated to respective 
individuals and controls are implemented in 
consistent manner. Initial testing is performed. 
Level 4: Test Adequate tests are routinely performed to 
ensure that all policies, procedures, and 
controls are acting as intended. Effective 
corrective actions, self-assessments, and 
independent audits are performed. 
Level 5: Integration Policies, procedures, implementations, and 
tests are continually reviewed and improved. IT 
security program is embedded into culture and 
an integrated practice. Continuous cost-benefit 
analysis is performed. 
Table  2-3: Levels of NIST Maturity Model [47] 
2.6.5 ISM3 Model 
Canal and his coauthors have developed a maturity model for Information Security Management 
(ISM)[48]. The model is called Information Security Management Maturity Model (ISM3 or ISM-cubed). 
This model is more abstract compared to other maturity models and is intended to evaluate and implement 
process-oriented information security management (ISM) systems. ISM3’s approach is based on the 
application of ISO9001 quality management concepts to ISM systems. ISM3 defines maturity in terms of 
the operation of key ISM processes and requires security to be aligned with business objectives [48]. 
Processes are allocated to maturity levels according to a spectrum, from a basic ISM system to an 




Figure  2-5: ISM3 Maturity Model [48]  
Source: Canal (2006) Version 1.20 
The correlation between security improvement and investment on security is supported by Mayfield's 
Paradox: 
Keeping everyone out of an information system requires an infinite 
amount of money and getting everyone onto an information system 
requires an infinite amount of money, but the costs between these 
extremes are relatively low.  [49]
An organization may choose to implement any of the defined processes at any stage of maturity 
assuming its relevance to specific security objectives. However, as clarified in Table  2-4, ISM3 defines 
five maturity models. Security risks and associated investment represent the sliding scale at every level in 






Maturity Level Description 
ISM3 Level 1 This level should result in a significant risk reduction from technical threats, for 
a minimum investment in essential ISM processes. 
ISM3 Level 2 
 
This level should result in further risk reduction from technical threats, for a 
moderate investment in ISM processes. 
ISM3 Level 3 
 
This level should result in the highest risk reduction from technical threats, for a 
significant investment in Information Security processes. 
ISM3 Level 4 
 
This level should result in the highest risk reduction from technical and internal 
threats, for a high investment in Information Security processes. 
ISM3 Level 5 
 
This level assumes the compulsory use and continuous improvements of process 
metrics. 
Table  2-4: Levels of ISM3 Maturity Model 
The deployment of ISM3 differs depending on whether or not there is an existing ISM system. If an 
ISM system is in place, the initiative starts by conducting a gap analysis of the systems and processes in 
place against the target ISM3 maturity level followed by ensuring that quality management is aligned 
with the organization’s security objectives and ISM3 standard. Otherwise (in case of new ISM 
implementation), the ISM3 is embedded into ISM formation process. However, Information Security 
Management consists of three management levels each of which has its own goals, practices, and 
processes [48]: 
• Strategic (Direct and Provide), which deals with broad goals 
• Tactical (Implement and Optimize), which deals with the design and implementation of the 
ISM system 
• Operational (Execute and Report), which deals with achieving defined goals by means of 
technical processes 
ISM3 is about process management. It suggests that, through well-defined processes, the information 
security is enhanced, risk is mitigated and, hence, maturity is measured. 
However, the performance of a well-designed ISM system depends on the budget, the capability and 
the commitment of those involved in running it. The use of ISM3 is about the way security is conducted. 
It does not guarantee that a process will perform properly or will deliver correct results, it only guarantees 
that the cause of faults is not ill-structured process [48]. 
2.6.6 OCTAVE Model 
Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE®) is a risk-based strategic 
assessment and planning technique for security developed at Carnegie Mellon University. The OCTAVE 
approach considers both organizational and technological issues [50]. OCTAVE is self-directed, meaning 
that people from an organization assume responsibility for setting the organization’s security strategy 
[51]. 
OCTAVE as a process is organized into three phases 1[51]: 
• Phase 1: Build Asset-Based Threat Profiles – The analysis team determines information-related 
asset measures. Then, it identifies threats to each critical asset, creating a threat profile 
• Phase 2: Identify Infrastructure Vulnerabilities – The analysis team examines network and 
information technology components related to each critical asset and their resistance to 
network attacks 
• Phase 3: Develop Security Strategy and Plans – The analysis team identifies risks to the 
organization’s critical assets and creates a protection strategy for the organization and 
mitigation plans to address the predefined risks to the critical assets 
 
 
Figure  2-6: OCTAVE Process 1[51] 
Source: Introduction to OCTAVE approach, Carnegie Mellon, Software Engineering Institute 
August 2003 
                                                     




                                                                                                                                                                          
2.6.7 CRAMM Model 
The Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency (CCTA) was tasked by the UK Government's 
Cabinet Office to investigate the risk analysis and management methods currently in existence within 
Central Government for information security. As a result, a new framework was developed by CCTA 
which drew upon all of the existing best practices under the title of the CCTA Risk Analysis and 
Management Method (CRAMM) [52]. 
CRAMM is a comprehensive risk assessment tool that is compliant with BS7799 and ISO 17799. 
CRAMM has a database of over 3000 security controls referenced to relevant risks and ranked by 
effectiveness and cost. CRAMM addresses tasks such as [52]: 
• Asset dependency modeling 
• Business impact assessment 
• Identifying and assessing threats and vulnerabilities 
• Assessing levels of risk and identifying required controls 
CRAMM implementation is a phased approach covering both technical (e.g. IT hardware and software) 
and non-technical (e.g. physical and human) aspects of security. To evaluate these components, CRAMM 
is divided into three stages: 
• Asset identification and valuation: 
The objective is to identify the physical (e.g. IT hardware), software (e.g. application packages), 
data (e.g. the information held on the IT system) and location of assets that make up the 
information system 
• Threat and vulnerability assessment: 
The objective is to determine the likelihood of deliberate and accidental occurrences of various 
incidents and then to calculate the level of the underlying or actual risk 
• Countermeasure selection and recommendation: 
Utilizing the CRAMM countermeasure library (consists of over 3000 detailed countermeasures 
organized into over 70 logical groupings), appropriate countermeasures are selected 
proportionately to predetermined assets and risk levels 
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Figure  2-7: CRAMM Process [52] 
Source: CRAMM, Version 5.1, http://www.cramm.com
2.6.8 SPMM Model 
The Security Program Maturity Model, developed by Chapin and Akridge [53], is an approach that 
distinguishes between maturity and quality of any security program and offers a model that measures both 
aspects and presents them combined together into one picture of security posture or dashboard display. 
Maturity from SPMM’s perspective is depicted by a simple judgment of the existence or nonexistence of 
large number of security elements derived from ISO17799 standard, where quality is depicted using a 
three-tiered quality factor: low, medium, and high, trying to transform the subjective metric (quality) into 
an objective one. The following table describes the ISO17799 domains covered by the model and 
associated elements of each domain: 
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Table  2-5: SPMM: General outline of the security maturity model [53] 
Source: Chapin and Akridge, How Can Security Be Measured, ISACA, Vol. 2, 2005 
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The following table clarifies the maturity using a sample of one domain (Asset Classification and 
Control) and the model suggested order for the implementation of its elements: 
 
Table  2-6: SPMM: Sample elements from security maturity model [53] 
Source: Chapin and Akridge, How Can Security Be Measured, ISACA, Vol. 2, 2005 
The following table depicts the quality of a specific element as a successor step of its maturity:   
 
Table  2-7: SPMM: Sample of a quality measure from security maturity model [53] 
Source: Chapin and Akridge, How Can Security Be Measured, ISACA, Vol. 2, 2005 
2.7 Information Security Maturity Model (ISMM) 
Information security is achieved by adopting and implementing the appropriate set of controls, which 
could be policies, procedures, practices, organizational structures or software tools and functions. If these 
controls are not well established, the objective of security will not be met and hence the security 
investments will have no or low significance to the organization benefits. 
Security cannot be achieved by only technical means, it should be augmented by appropriate 
management and procedures [31]. As detailed in [21] and briefed in [1], the Information Security 
Maturity Model (ISMM) developed by the author is a five-level process-based framework. It is developed 
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for maturity assessment of information security and evaluation of the level of security awareness and 
practice (which are affected by people, process, and technology) at any ICT-enabled organization, be it 
public or private sector. Furthermore, it helps to better understand where and to what extent the three 
main processes of security (prevention, detection, and recovery) are implemented and integrated (see 
Figure  2-8). 
In essence, the ISMM model is intended to assist organizations in maturing their information security 
posture in order to improve business performance and hence business continuity. It reflects both technical 
and social engineering aspects of information security aspects (hence the words awareness and practice), 
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Figure  2-8: Information Security Maturity Model1  
The ISMM model depicts three different dimensions [21,1], these are: 
• The layering dimension: demonstrated on the model by five consecutive layers starting from 
physical and environmental security layer at the bottom and moving up the hierarchy to the 
definite security layer. This dimension captures the technology aspect of security 
• The process dimension: represented by the three fundamental security processes: prevention, 
detection and recovery. This dimension captures the process aspect 
• The people dimension: represented by two indices, sophistication and visibility indices. These 
indices are exhibited and exposed on the people side. Hence, this dimension captures the 
people’s effect 
 Chapter 3 provides revised explanations of these three dimensions and new extensions towards the 
application of the whole model. 
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2.8 Standard Network Models 
2.8.1 Introduction 
Networking functions are organized and described in a layered architecture. There are two main 
networking models: the ISO/OSI (International Standards Organization/Open Systems Interconnect) 
reference model and the TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) reference model. 
These two models share the same idea behind the layering approach: the services of one layer are 
implemented and offered by the layer immediately below it, and different layers can be designed more or 
less independently for specific functions [2]. 
2.8.2 ISO/OSI Model 
The ISO/OSI reference model was developed in 1984 by the International Standards Organization (ISO). 
The model is considered a conceptual framework of standards for communication in the network across 
different platforms and applications by different vendors and, hence, the primary architectural model for 
inter-computing and internetworking communications. The ISO/OSI model defines the communication 
process into a set of steps across seven layers. The main purpose of multiple layers is to provide clearly 
defined functions (a task or a group of tasks) in order to improve internetworking connectivity between 
different systems [2,54,55,56,57,58]. 
Layer Function Examples 
Application Interacts with operating system and applications (user 
access) 
CMIP, FTAM, VTP, RTSE, X.400, 
X.500 
Presentation Converts data into standard format ISO-PP: OSI Presentation Layer 
Protocol 
Session Establishes and maintains end-to-end connections ISO-SP: OSI Session Layer Protocol 
Transport Reliable end-to-end packet transmission ISO-TP: OSI Transport Protocols: 
TP0, TP1, TP2, TP3, TP4 
Network Routing, multiplexing, and addressing functions CONP, ES-IS, IS-IS, ISO-IP, CLNP 
Data link Reliable node-to-node packet transmission IEEE 802.2, IEEE 802.3, IEEE 
802.5, FDDI, X.25 
Physical Physical characteristics of the network (bit 
transmission carrier) 
IEEE 802.2 hardware, IEEE 802.3 
hardware, FDDI hardware, X.25 
hardware 
Table  2-8: Functions of ISO/OSI network layers 
2.8.3 TCP/IP Model 
The TCP/IP reference model was developed in 1970s by the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA), an agency of the United States Department of Defense (DoD). The TCP/IP model is 
27 
sometimes referred to as the TCP/IP protocol stack, it is basically a layered abstract description for 
communications and computer network protocol design. The model does not exactly match the ISO/OSI 
seven layers, however, there is no universal consensus regarding a specific description of TCP/IP layers 
but it is generally agreed that there are fewer levels than the seven layers of the ISO/OSI model (usually 
described in terms from three to five layers). However, the TCP/IP model does exclude some features and 
combines others found under the ISO/OSI model [2,54,55,56,57,58]. 
Layer Function Examples 
Application Interacts with operating system and applications (user access). 
It includes functions of the ISO OSI upper three layers. 
SMTP, FTP, SSH, HTTP 
Transport End-to-end message transmission. The Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) guarantees that information is received as it 
was sent. The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) performs no 
end-to-end reliability checks. 
TCP, UDP, RSVP, DCCP 
Network Establish and maintain end-to-end connections (addressing 
and routing functions). 
IP (IPv4, IPv6), ICMP, 
IGMP, ARP 
Data Link Reliable node-to-node packet transmission. Ethernet, Wi-Fi, PPP, 
FDDI, ATM, Frame 
Relay, GPRS, Bluetooth 
Physical Physical characteristics of the network (bit transmission 
carrier). 
Modems, ISDN, USB, 
Ethernet physical layer, 
Wi-Fi, GSM, Bluetooth 
Table  2-9: Functions of TCP/IP network layers 
The following table demonstrates the mapping between ISO/OSI and TCP/IP reference models: 
 Data Unit Layers in ISO/OSI Model Layers in TCP/IP Model 
(7) Application 









Segments (4) Transport (4) Transport 
Packets (3) Network (3) Network 








Bits (1) Physical  (1) Physical 
Table  2-10: Layers mapping between ISO/OSI and TCP/IP network models 
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2.9 Summary 
We live in an information age, where information technology drives our economy, pervades our culture 
and assists in educating our people. Understanding technology impact, its exposure and sophistication, 
facilitates a solid ground for adopting integrated security approach that best fits security needs and 
organizational culture. This is obviously fundamental to the success of our current and future digital 
economy. 
Alan Greenspan has mentioned that the rapid growth of the economy in the past ten years has been 
mostly due to synergies gained via information technology, and the resultant push in capital spending as a 
result of technology implementation as information technology is a major influencer on economy [59]. 
Information security at present is in the forefront as a leading technology requirement. All 
organizations, whether they are commercial, nonprofit, or governmental, must face the realities of an 
electronic world where information security practices are not even vital to organization success but rather 
to its survival. 
Security measurement is a very subjective issue which varies according to different people 
perspectives, and process and technology deployed in any ICT-enabled environment. As a maturity 
model, the ISMM presents an architecture model applicable at any ICT-enabled organization of any size. 
The ISMM model will be very useful for the governance and delivery of information security in any 
organization where information asset is of value. 
It has become essential for organizations, both government and commercial businesses, to adopt vendor 
and product-neutral methodologies, to circumvent traditional risk analysis which requires constant 
maintenance of threat assessment, vulnerability assessment, and asset values, and to avoid over-
estimating use of best practices which are not tailored to the organization applying it. 
It is very common in security standards to demonstrate comprehensive domains of information 
security. But, organizations still need to determine and structure and scope of applicability of security 
controls in every domain, and to know exactly the security conceptual boundary of controls in place. 
Security policy as an example is mistakenly considered by many people in the IT field to be about the 
very basic access controls such as minimum password length, and as a result, some IT managers consider 
themselves as applying strict security access policies where in reality they only apply a very small portion 
of a prevention mechanism at a specific security boundary, the application level. 
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However, from the above reviews of various standards and security models, approaches to information 
security can be classified into five distinct types as follows: 
No. Approach/Model Type Examples Remarks 
1 Best practices oriented BS7799, ISO17799, 
ISO27001 
Compiled list of best practices. 
2 Process oriented SSE-CMM, ISM3, 
COBIT, NIST 
Use elements specified in other standards and 
best practices. 
3 Risk oriented CRAMM, 
OCTAVE 
Use basic assets and risk assessment 
methodology. 
4 Controls oriented  SPMM Use elements specified in other standards and 
best practices. 
5 Security oriented ISMM Measures security itself, which is the contribution 
of this research. 
Table  2-11: Categorization of various security models  
Table  2-12 shows a brief comparison between the ISMM model and other security models in general and 
maturity models in specific.  
No. ISMM Other security models 
1 Offers specific view of the security system 
(determined view). 
Offer very high level view of the security system 
(topmost view). 
2 Measures how good “security itself” is 
implemented. 
Measure how good “process itself” is 
implemented. 
3 Defines/abstracts security boundaries. Don’t define/abstract security boundaries. 
4 Defines/abstracts security system resources. Don’t define/abstract security system resources. 
5 Derives a relevant attack model. Independent from attack models. 
6 Captures process, people and layering 
dimensions. 
Capture process maturity dimension only. 
7 Based on the security life cycle (an open cycle). Usually based on either project management or 
software engineering development life cycles. 
8 Simple to understand and easy to apply. Complex, expensive and hard to apply. 
9 Can be applied to small organizations, 
independent machines and communication 
devices (scalable). 
Cannot be applied to small organizations or 
independent machines (inflexible). 
Table  2-12: Comparison between the ISMM and other Models 
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The ISMM model responds to the following industrial needs: 
1. A relative measure of where the enterprise is in terms of security level. The model provides an 
efficient method to perform gap analysis against industry peers and best practices 
2. An indication of security adequacy measure (i.e. evidence of organization’s stance on security), to 
reduce the ever-growing risk interdependencies among different organizations of different sizes. Such 
applications may include e-government, e-commerce, partnering, outsourcing and contracting 
endeavors 
3. An approach to efficiently decide where to go, a measure for progress, and a method to set priorities 
for achieving goals and further improvements 
4. Security investments are still protected when the ISMM is adopted. As ISMM is compatible with the 
implementation and use of other security standards and maturity models such as ITIL, Cobit, ISO 
27001 [60], and ISO 17799 [61]. This compatibility protects the existing investment in security systems 
when they are enhanced using the ISMM 
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Chapter 3 
Applications of ISMM 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter starts with an extended overview of the ISMM work, covering all of its properties: layering, 
processes, and people dimensions, beside model propositions and dependencies. This addition introduces 
a new abstraction of both information security conceptual boundaries and corresponding resources used 
within a computing environment. Consequently, facilitating grounds for further extensions such as 
measure of amount of information security cost, definition of optimal security, attack model, mapping to 
network models. 
3.2 ISMM Extended 
3.2.1 The Layering Dimension 
The ISMM model depicts five different security layers, each of which has its own definition, scope of 
applicability, and characteristics. There is also an implicit layer at the very bottom (called ad-hoc layer or 
layer 0), this implied layer suggest no controls, policies, or any structured security activities are in place: 
Physical and Environmental Security (level 1):  
The controls at this level aim at preventing unauthorized physical access or interference with the 
organization or ICT equipments and information assets. Physical security of IT equipment and having 
restricted access control to operations room are clear examples of security controls at this level. Other 
mechanisms may include site design and layout, environmental components, power and fire controls, and 
emergency response readiness to protect people, data, systems, and the facility itself. 
Obviously people with modest knowledge and common sense can identify some of the security controls 
at this level (e.g. having recording cameras or security gates). Typically these controls are more visible 
and exposed to people than other controls (e.g. platforms configuration). Therefore, the ISMM model 
implies that visibility index at this level is the highest compared to other higher levels. On the contrary, 
sophistication index (management requirement and knowledge sophistication) is the lowest as shown in 
the diagram. 
The ISMM also shows that three main processes are applied on this level. For example, security gates 
could be used as a prevention mechanism, recording cameras as a detection mechanism, and while having 
duplicated cameras in the same area using different power sources represent a recovery mechanism for 
this particular control and not the whole security system. 
Front-end System Security (level 2): 
Front-end system security is about all application level system functions and integrity requirements 
between the application component itself and end-user interface. It suggests that application data should 
be well protected against any potential threat that might cause loss, damage, or unauthorized access by 
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either internal or external users. Examples of security controls are application access controls and 
application change management process. 
The ISMM model suggests that the visibility index decreases here as compared to level-1. Clearly, the 
number of people who are exposed to this security boundary (e.g. application developers and users) is less 
than at the previous level (who could be people from outside the organization itself). On the other hand, 
the sophistication index is higher at this level compared to previous one. Clearly, this is due to the deeper 
knowledge required for both security awareness and practice of security controls at this level. 
Prevention, detection, and recovery processes apply at this level, too. Restricting application access to 
authorized users (prevention), logging application access (detection), tracking application changes 
(recovery) are examples of common practices in this level. 
Back-end System Security (level 3):  
The back-end system security boundary includes any resource (e.g. hardware, software, process) that is 
beyond application level components. The underlying network infrastructure and internal and external 
communication devices constitute the major components at this level. 
Examples may include data and communication cryptographic mechanisms, router and switch access 
lists, configuration of data center platforms, intrusion detection systems and firewalls. 
The ISMM suggests that the visibility and exposure of such controls at this level decreases compared to 
lower levels as equipment is presumably placed in less accessible areas. The underlying encryption 
mechanism as an example is almost transparent to even application users. Additionally, the required depth 
and sophistication of knowledge at this level is usually more than what is required at front-end system 
security controls. This is further justified by looking at the available average number in the IT community 
of application programmers as opposed to cryptographic specialists. Therefore, the sophistication index 
increases at this conceptual boundary. 
On the other hand, the three main processes apply here too. As a prevention control, the deployment of 
encryption mechanism for network traffic may be applied, deployment of an IDS system as a detection 
and installation of backup communication lines as a recovery mechanism. 
Comprehensive Security Awareness (level 4):  
Security awareness requirements are identified and affected by people.  Expenditure on security 
awareness programs needs to be balanced against the business harm likely to result from people 
awareness failures. Therefore, this level implies the scope of security awareness to include the whole of 
the organization staff and encapsulates the practice of lower level requirements, hence the word 
“Comprehensive”. This layer persuades the need for the organization to operate in a security-conscious 
culture in all technologies deployed across all lower layers.  
Although use of the latest security products and the development and implementation of information 
security policies, standards, procedures and guidelines are imperative to the success of the overall 
information security system, it will be an ineffective system if all of these products are not brought to the 
attention of those people who are expected to adhere to them. No amount of technology can diminish the 
human factor. The author stresses that the right awareness drives the right practice of security 
phenomenon which is the main reason for having security awareness at lower levels too (level 1, 2, and 
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3). The commitment of all employees, especially top level management, is a major requirement at this 
level. Hence, involvement is first step towards gaining real commitment. 
Technology alone cannot ensure the security of a system: 
Most advanced equipment and security safeguards are to no avail if all 
the users are not properly trained to be part of the security plan. [62]
The awareness of people is an unseen element but is demonstrated by their behaviors, which explains 
why the ISMM suggests that the visibility index is less at this level when compared to lower levels. On 
the other hand, the depth and sophistication of knowledge and management requirements (sophistication 
index) is the highest compared to lower levels, since it is solely about people and people alone! 
The three main processes of prevention, detection, and recovery are applied too. Having appropriate 
awareness training courses, observing people behavior, continuous improvements of security controls are 
examples of possible practices embedded into these processes.  
Definite Security (level 5): 
Security measurement is always a subjective rather than an objective issue. Accordingly, different 
people have different perspectives. This layer captures applied security knowledge, culture and 
confidence in the organization, as applied security knowledge is essentially based on critical thinking, 
observation, and analysis abilities. However, definite security could be a virtual feeling but in reality, it 
can never be fulfilled completely since security in general is a continuous process and associated with 
needs, leading to motivation, execution, confidence, trust and hence emotion (feeling secure). Therefore, 
the presence of this layer is essential to the model, first, to reflect this vital security boundary, second, to 
point out security is a continuous process once started (i.e. open life cycle) and third, to show that there is 
no such thing as a 100 percent secure computing environment or platform or communication device. 
There is no denying that there is no such system that is absolutely secure since there is no foolproof 
"silver bullet" system or security solution. There is always a probability even very small that something 
wrong could happen. However, there are many systems that are rated as highly secure and designed in 
such a way so that they almost can detect and recover from many known incidents immediately. It is 
worth noting that this layer differentiates a key characteristic of this security maturity model from others 
which are usually based on software engineering and project management development life cycles. 
3.2.2 The Process Dimension 
The process dimension of the ISMM model depicts the three main processes of security, these are: 
Security Prevention Process: 
Information is an asset that requires protection commensurate with its value. Security measures must be 
taken to protect information from unauthorized modification, destruction, or disclosure whether 
accidental or intentional. During the prevention phase, quality security policies and procedures, controls 
and processes should be designed and implemented covering all various conceptual boundaries from the 
ISMM model perspective.  
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Security Detection Process:  
Detection of a system compromise is extremely critical: detection process suggests that proper systems 
(e.g. Perimeter IDS and logical IDS) and legal mechanism (e.g. forensic evidence) are deployed to detect 
any irregular behaviors of the system at early stages. Risk management (including risk assessment) in 
addition to penetration testing and ethical hacking procedures are all proactive mechanisms that can be 
conducted to expose and detect system vulnerabilities before others. 
Security Recovery Process: 
For the detection process to have any value there must be a timely response. The response to an 
incident should be well planned and tested in advance. A Computer Security Incident Response Team 
(CSIRT) should be established with specific roles and responsibilities identified. CSIRT people should be 
formed to act upon security events in a proper timeframe. The goal of the recovery process is to restore 
systems to the original working conditions. The recovery plan should be clearly written and approved by 
appropriate levels of management, additionally, it has to be tested and reviewed frequently and should 
encompass all proposed layers. 
3.2.3 The People Dimension 
As described earlier, people dimension consists of two main indexes: 
Visibility Index: 
The visibility index demonstrates the scope of exposure of such security controls at people (whether 
organization employees or outsiders). It is obvious that this index increases when moving down the 
hierarchy, because visibility of controls at lower levels is more exposed than controls at higher levels as 
described earlier. A clear example would be visibility of physical assets and monitoring tools (such as 
cameras) at level-1 compared to visibility of awareness element of people behavior at level-4. Obviously, 
awareness is less visible which justifies such a proposition. 
 Sophistication Index: 
The ISMM suggests that the depth of knowledge required, Total Cost of Ownership (TCO), and skills 
and sophistication of management increase when moving up the hierarchy along the model. An example 
would be comparing the knowledge required to configure back-end system controls (such as configuring 
firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems) to efforts required to configure and manage physical and 
environmental security controls (such as recording cameras at main hallway). 
3.2.4 Model Propositions 
Sensitive ICT-enabled environments should always seek potential improvements and promotion to higher 
levels, and review security processes regularly in order to be proactive and avoid potential security 
incidents. The following propositions are important to understand the analogy and mechanism of the 
ISMM framework as opposed to others: 
• Maturity at a given ISMM layer is reached by implementing quality prevention, detection and 
recovery security controls on that layer and its preceding layers 
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• There is an implicit layer at the bottom of the hierarchy, called ad-hoc security (could be also 
called level 0). Being at this level means complete lack of recognition of security issues. It 
suggests that the organization has no security controls, plans, policies or any security 
requirement in place. In other words, the organization has to have structured security practice 
in place in order to be eligible to have a position on the proposed security framework 
• Risk Management, Business Continuity Planning (BCP), Disaster Recovery Planning (DRP), 
and other security practices are all embedded in security processes and intended to be reflected 
on different levels across the ISMM Model. Therefore, Risk Management process, as an 
example, is not a single function of level-1 only, it is rather required to be deployed at other 
levels in the hierarchy. Such a proposition helps to identify exactly the relevance and scope of 
applicability of each requirement and hence, avoid the false impression of its completeness 
while it is only implemented on limited scope from the ISMM perspective 
• The provided logical order doesn’t necessarily mean a certain level requirement must be met 
fully before a subsequent level requirement arises. A more realistic description is in terms of 
decreasing percentages of meeting requirements along levels of the ISMM hierarchy. For 
example, arbitrary and logical figures for an organization may be: 85 percent in meeting 
physical and environmental requirements (level 1), 70 percent in front-end system security 
(level 2), 50 percent in back-end system security, 25 percent in comprehensive security 
awareness, and 10 percent in definite security. In essence, it is logical practice that there is a 
gradual emergence of meeting higher-level requirements as lower-level requirements become 
more satisfied. But, again it is not always the case as some environments, due to lack of 
knowledge, focus more on network security (level-3) while leaving application security wide 
open (level-2) which has more exposure! 
• Being qualified at level-n means the current system has fulfilled, to an acceptable and relevant 
ratio, all security controls and requirements of level-n and subsequent lower levels too. In other 
words, logically, lower level security requirements need to be taken care of first, or at least to a 
considerable extent before promotion 
• If a lower level security violation occurs for a given organization, its security measurement 
(score) decreases to that level immediately. A more realistic example: if a removable storage is 
stolen in level-3 qualified organization, then that organization will be level-1 qualified instead 
until the recovery process completes and appropriate countermeasure are implemented 
successfully. This proposition coincides with the famous saying that security chain is measured 
by its weakest link 
• Definite security can never be fulfilled completely since security is a continuous process. 
Therefore, the level of security is rather identified and measured by subjective metrics more 
than objective ones 
3.2.5 Model Dependencies 
The ISMM was the end result of an extensive study of relevant literature, the industry, and a thorough 
review of various international frameworks and quality standards such as ISO17799/BS7799, ISO27001, 
Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model CMM (SSE-CMM), Capability Maturity Model 
Integration (CMMI), Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (CobiT), Six Sigma, 
and Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE). However, the main 
body of the ISMM model is developed based on two main dependencies, context and content 
dependencies: 
Context Dependency: 
The context dependency of the ISMM model is based on the intervention with the work of Maslow who 
put a theoretical framework of individual personality development and motivation based on a hierarchy of 
human needs. Human motivation doesn’t have a complete development life cycle that ends at a certain 
level but it has a start point. Maslow’s work may still have broad applicability in the business world. It 
consists of five distinctive levels as follows: 
• The physiological needs 
• The safety and security needs 
• The love and belonging needs 
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Figure  3-1: Maslow Hierarchy Theory, 1943 [32] 
The ISMM model inherits some context features of Maslow theory. Particularly, the following points: 
• The ISMM model inherits the layering feature of Maslow, and the incremental growth of the 
requirements along the hierarchy 
• The ISMM model inherits the feature of probability of undervaluing implemented security 
controls over a period of time: 
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A need once satisfied is no longer a motivator, therefore, a need which is 
being satisfied over a period of time may be undervalued, people who 
have never suffered from thirst may tend to undervalue its effects on 
them, and regard drink as unimportant element for them. [34] 
• In keeping with Maslow theory up to this point, if self-actualizing level is wanted, then lower 
level needs are to be taken care of first, or at least to a considerable extent [33]. Therefore 
Maslow’s top level involves the continuous desire to fulfill potentials, to  
Becoming everything that one is capable of becoming.  [32] 
In comparison to the ISMM, organizations logically should continuously seek fulfilling lower 
levels requirements first in order to promote to higher levels. It is irrational to invest more on 
back-end system security (e.g. encryption) if computer room (where critical servers reside) 
placed in an open area! 
• According to Maslow, motivation for people varies since they have different needs based on 
their level on the hierarchy. In comparison, the ISMM model suggests that motivation for 
implementing security controls for an organization varies based on its security needs and its 
current position on the ISMM hierarchy 
• These elements in Maslow hierarchy are not to be considered as a rigid framework, there might 
be a number of exceptions to order indicated, a reversal of the hierarchy might apply to some 
people: 
Although Maslow suggests that most people have these basic needs in 
about the order indicated, he also makes it clear that the hierarchy is not 
necessarily a fixed order.  [33] 
• The ISMM model suggests that a number of exceptions might exist where some organizations 
do not meet logical order when deploying overall security controls. Lack of expertise on 
particular area (e.g. application security) might affect deployed security controls at respective 
layer (i.e. improper application architecture or change tracking controls) 
• According to Maslow, if deprived of the source of satisfaction from a lower order need, it will 
again become a motivator, which is again seeking for fulfillment of lower level needs. For 
example, if an esteem-level employee is given notice of job termination, natural reaction would 
be to start looking for a new job, which is again seeking for fulfillment of needs of lower levels 
[34] 
In comparison, the ISMM model suggests that if a security breach occurs at lower level for a 
given organization, then its security level drops immediately to that level where breach took 
place 
• The degrees of satisfaction are described in terms of decreasing percentages of satisfaction 
when moving along levels of the hierarchy. A false impression may be given that a need must 
be fulfilled completely before next level’s needs arise. As clarified earlier, the ISMM inherits 
this feature too 
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• The ISMM model inherits the feature of Level 5 (self actualization needs) as it is not like other 
levels, where the opportunities presented cannot be exhausted or fulfilled completely [34] 
• The ISMM model inherits the feature of Maslow’s work of not considering human motivation 
a complete life cycle with a clear start and end as opposed to other knowledge disciplines (such 
as software development or project management life cycles). The ISMM considers security a 
continuous process once started (i.e. open life cycle) in a similar analogy to Maslow’s 
• The ISMM model inherits Maslow’s context of need, which leads to motivation, and hence, 
feeling and confidence factors 
Content Dependency: 
It is apparent that contents of the ISMM layers and associated security controls can be easily made 
compatible with requirements of major domains of any information security standards. However, contents 
are mainly derived from ISO 17799 standard domains as being the most widely accepted standard. The 
questionnaire attached (see Appendix) was used in earlier work as part of research methodology during 
the development of this model [21], it however highlights some attributes of the information security 
requirements associated with each level. 
ISO/IEC 17799 lists ten distinctive controls for information security management systems (currently 
modified to eleven controls) [31,37,38,61]: 
1. Security Policy 
2. Information Security Infrastructure 
3. Asset Classification and Control 
4. Personnel Security 
5. Physical and Environmental Security 
6. Communications and Operations Management 
7. Access Control 
8. System Development and Maintenance 
9. Business Continuity Management 
10. Compliance 
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The strength of the ISMM model comes from the structured thinking about information security level 
which is a very subjective and sophisticated process. The practice of each requirement of ISO17799 is 
reflected on the model according to its scope of applicability across all levels including the natural 
synergistic relationship between physical and cyber security (or IT security). ISO17799 as example 
provides a clear description of security policy and its importance (domain 1), but the ISMM additionally 
focuses on the applicability and scope of practice of that security policy (spoken, written, and deployed) 
in the organization according to hierarchy suggested. It stresses that security policy should not give false 
impression of security, be misunderstood or undervalued by applying it only to limited scope in the 
organization and then misguidedly considered as complete. The scope of practice of such requirement 
should be further identified, bounded and reflected on all relevant levels (e.g. level 1, 2, 3…up the 
hierarchy) [21]. However, some ISO17799 requirements such as physical and environmental security 
apply the most on level-1 of the ISMM model. 
Nevertheless, the ISMM model helps to better understand the application of information security 
controls outlined in ISO17799. Table  3-1 shows contents matrix that maps the scope of applicability 
between various security controls mentioned in ISO17799 ten domains and the corresponding scope on 
the ISMM model [21]. 
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ISO17799 Standard ISMM Model (Scope of applicability) 
Domain 











1 Security policy n/a     
Information security infrastructure      
Security of third-part access      2 Organizational security 
Outsourcing      
Accountability for assets      
3 Asset classification and control Information classification      
Security in job definition and resourcing      
User training      4 Personnel security 
Responding to security incidents/malfunctions      
Secure areas      
Equipment security      5 
Physical and 
environmental 
security General controls      
Operational procedures and responsibilities      
System planning and acceptance      
Protection against malicious software      
Housekeeping      
Network management      





Exchange of information and software      
Business requirement for access control      
User access management      
User responsibilities      
Network access control      
Operating system access control      
Application access control      
Monitoring system access and use      
7 Access control 
Mobile computing and teleworking      
Security requirement of systems      
Security in application systems      
Cryptographic controls      
Security of system files      
8 System development and maintenance 
Security in development and support processes      
9 Business continuity n/a      
Compliance with legal requirements      
Review of security policy and  compliance      10 Compliance 
System audit considerations      
Table  3-1: Mapping matrix of ISO17799 domains and the ISMM model [21,1] 
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3.3 Optimal Security 
The literature is vague on finding a precise and abstract definition of optimal security. Two versions of an 
optimal security definition are suggested as part of this research effort. The first one is considered to be a 
detailed one and meant to capture the main characteristics of the optimal security level of any computing 
environment. The second definition on the other side is meant to be concise and abstracted to reflect the 
main approach for achieving optimal security, which in turn implies meeting all key requirements covered 
in the first definition. 
Optimal security can be defined as continuous fulfillment of security requirements of all the relevant 
ISMM conceptual boundaries in accordance with the need of the environment under study.  
Or 
Fulfillment of security requirements of all the relevant ISMM conceptual boundaries continuously and 
proportionately with the need of the environment under study. 
This detailed definition is thought to capture key principles of information security process from the 
ISMM perspective, these are: 1) continuous fulfillment, 2) deployment of relevant security controls, and 
3) reflection of conceptual security layers. 
Moreover, optimal security can be defined in an abstract way as continuously and proportionately 
seeking to fulfill level 5 requirements.  
Or 
Continuously and proportionately seeking to fulfill level 5 security needs. 
This is a short definition that summarizes the key aspect behind those principles of first definition into 
one main objective, which is seeking development and maintenance of relevant security controls in a 
continuous fashion. 
3.4 ISMM Attack Model 
The ISMM model characterizes a new perspective on the concept and attributes of attack techniques and 
models in information security. The new paradigm classifies various attack approaches in terms of their 
resultant impact. Attacks, both passive (i.e. intercepting information only) and active (i.e. changing 
information), are classified in terms of their impact and breaches left in the victim’s system. Moreover, 
attacks are linked with their corresponding ISMM layers, such linkage leads to capture and discover the 
“weakness in depth” as opposed to the “defense in depth” concept when using the original ISMM model 
as a defense/protection model. Such classification offers a useful tool to better realize and hence improve 
the organization’s security posture, estimate encountered impact, specify required recovery procedures, 
and allocate appropriate investment to fix breaches found. 
The following diagram (Figure  3-2) depicts the suggested ISMM attack model. It defines five levels of 
attacks, each of which is mapped to its corresponding layer in the ISMM model. Layer 1 to 4 denotes 
single attacks where layer 5 denotes hybrid attacks, which means any combination of two or more attacks 
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Figure  3-2: ISMM Attack Model 
Layer 1 Attack as example means the organization has encountered an attack which targeted controls in 
layer 1 (physical and environmental security controls) such as breaking the secret key for CCTV system. 
Man-in-the middle and chosen-ciphertext attacks against public-key encryption in IPSec implementation 
are considered Layer 2 attacks, while same type of attacks on SSL implementation are considered Layer 3 
attacks, and the same analogy applies to other layers in the ISMM. Therefore, attacks are classified based 
on their origin and impact from the ISMM attack model’s perspective. This attack model offers a useful 
tool in order to: 
• Analyze and study various attacks (attack in depth) 
• Analyze and track down the main origin of security breaches (weakness in depth) 
• Locate incidents and their impacts accurately and hence speed up recovery procedures 
• Guide to the right and necessary system fixes 
• Plan and optimize efforts and investments in the maintenance and development of security 
controls 
• Associate attacks to their relevant breaches for every organizational context, as similar attacks 
might cause different impact to different organizations 
• Assist to better estimate cost of security, its return, and its failures 
3.5 Mapping ISMM to Network Models 
As mentioned earlier, networking functions are organized and described in a layered architecture (both 
ISO/OSI and TCP/IP reference models). Many services and protocols are implemented as part of the 
distinct functions embedded into layers of these models. However, many security breaches are created too 
42 
as both needs and respective technologies continuously evolve and change. Security experts and houses 
however are always trying to catch up and develop various products and services in trying to control these 
exploits and reduce caused risks. Nevertheless, this section suggests a mapping between the ISMM and 
Network models. 
The key questions to ask in order to understand potential benefits behind the mapping between the 
ISMM and network reference models and the adaptation of the ISMM model in this dilemma are: 
• Is the organization/environment under study implementing appropriate measures and controls 
on all networking layers of the model in use (whether ISO/OSI or TCP/IP)? 
• Will the implementation of appropriate security measures and controls on all these layers of the 
network model guarantee a secure communication environment? 
• What is the optimized distribution or formula for resources usage ratios, including 
computational power, energy, and memory beside other investments, among these controls 
across all networking layers? And, what are their actual weights on the ISMM? In other words, 
where does the balance lie? 
Figure  3-3 depicts the proposed mapping between the ISMM and network models. The mapping shows 
how the order and priority of implementation of functions and services among networking models are not 
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Figure  3-3: Mapping ISMM to Network Models 
There are many security implementations in various layers of networking models. Some protocols are 
implemented with built-in security functions while in many others security functions were added later on 
in the design. General examples of security functions may include SSH and HTTPS in the application 
layer, SSL and TLS in Presentation and Session layers, IPSec in network layer, Error and Flow Control in 
Data Link Layer.  
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Each one of these implementations has its own design details and various configuration parameters. 
TLS and SSL as an example are cryptographic protocols which provide secure communications on the 
Internet for such things as web browsing, e-mail, Internet faxing, instant messaging and other data 
transfers. TLS uses some cryptographic primitives to offer endpoints with authentication and 
communications privacy, and is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery [2].  
One method of TLS implementation is to only allow the server side to be authenticated (identity is 
ensured) while the client remains unauthenticated. The other way is called mutual authentication where 
both sides, client and server, are authenticated and this implementation requires PKI deployments to both 
sides, this approach requires the following key phases in general: 
• Peer negotiation for algorithms and associated crypto parameters 
• Public key encryption for authentication and key exchange 
• Symmetric cipher for traffic encryption 
The following schemas and algorithms may be used [2]: 
• Public-key cryptography: RSA, Diffie-Hellman, DSA, ECC 
• Symmetric ciphers:  RC4, IDEA, Triple DES, AES 
• One-way hash functions: MD5 or SHA 
Regardless of which combination is used, it is worth noting that any implementation of these options 
requires certain processing power, memory, and energy resources of the computing platform or 
environment, this is of course besides the required policies, procedures, and various other costs (i.e. 
development and maintenance) associated with human factors. Theoretically, summing up the totals of 
these resources and other costs yields total investment cost for that particular security control (i.e. 
TLS/SSL implementation). Obviously, all these resources and costs have lower and upper bounds, they 
are finite quantities! Moreover, these figures convey useful and yet sensitive information when mapped to 
the ISMM and network models as they tell the actual amount of investment and return per layer on both 
models (i.e. the ISMM and Network models).   
Obviously, TLS example mentioned above tells more information about security level when reflected 
on the ISMM model. With this mapping, for any environment, it can easily derive the information about 
all security controls and measures in place at every layer in both models, the ISMM and Network. 
Implementing TLS/SSL is only one measure that fills up a requirement gap in level 2 in the ISMM model 
(Front-end system security) even though it is implemented in higher layers in ISO/OSI and TCP/IP 
network models. 
The example does not state that this control (i.e. TLS/SSL) is enough for that particular environment or 
even that layer. Moreover, having security controls in other layers in network model does not mean 
reaching sufficiency level of security! This is the reason that makes the ISMM model offers richer 
information about integrity and security level, network models fill up only some gaps in different levels in 
the ISMM and still leave others untouched. Nevertheless, network models do not tell logical order of 
priority of implementation, as it was not originally meant to be, in terms of security posture.  
Following practical example shall clarify these arguments, assume an organization that implements a 
reliable IPSec encryption using PKI infrastructure (layer 3 in network models: network layer) which is 
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considered level 3 control in the ISMM. Assume 256-bits cryptographic strength is used with the 
following setting as recommended by NSA Suite B [63] and in NIST SP-800 Crypto Specifications [64]: 
Crypto function Algorithm 
Encryption AES-256 bits 
Hashing SHA-512 bits 
Key Exchange ECDH-512 bits 
Digital 
Signature 
ECDSA-512 bits (equivalent to RSA-15360 
bits) 
Table  3-2: Example of 256-bits cryptographic strength 
Now, if the application authentication mechanism is not strong enough, then the security level cannot 
exceed ISMM level 2 regardless of the reliability of IPSec implementation and complexity of its 
encryption used, as Front-End system security comes before Back-End, also if some of the physical assets 
such as network cards or hard disks are not physically protected enough, then it can not even pass ISMM 
level 1 (Physical and Environmental Security Level) which is worse than what it might seems to be. In 
this case it is possible that appropriate security measures (cryptographic controls on all networking levels) 
are taken and the organization still does not qualify for more than level 1 security in the ISMM model, 
again when the physical aspects are missing! This concern is significant and currently getting more 
attention by security professionals than ever as physical security is extraordinary rising due to the rapid 
advances in wireless computing. 
The previous example shows how the adaptation of the ISMM model can tell richer information about 
what security controls are in place in network models, where do they match on the ISMM model? What 
gaps are missing? What resources are being used and at what ratios? And hence helps to covey a more 
realistic picture about actual security and avoid the illusion of security! 
3.6 Implementation Snapshot 
To further clarify the resulted benefits of adopting the ISMM and its mapping to existing network models 
for any computing/communication system, two scenarios are presented. Similar security controls at 
various layers in both the ISMM and Network models are assumed in both examples. The first scenario 
depicts a typical computing environment with different computing and communication systems. The 
second scenario shows same environment mapped to the ISMM model where security controls are 
compiled and reflected. 
Scenario 1: Typical environment 
The following diagram (Figure  3-4) depicts a typical computing environment with multiple computing 
and communication systems and devices, say personal computers, servers, handheld devices, routers, 




















































AL: Application Layer    TL: Transport Layer    NL: Network Layer    DLL: Data Link Layer    PL: Physical Layer
Figure  3-4: Typical computing environment 
Scenario 2: The ISMM adopted 
In this scenario, the same computing systems and devices are used but all relevant information about 
existing security controls are compiled and reflected in the ISMM model. It is worth noting that the 
ISMM model is meant to be mainly mapped to the organization under study or computing environment as 
a whole. However, it can be further mapped to smaller blocks like different sites, department, operation 
rooms, and even down to a single computing/communication platform/system. Such scalability offers 
more information about actual security implementation at both the macro and micro level of the 
organization. Figure  3-5 shows a simple way of reflecting all security controls in place in the ISMM 
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Figure  3-5: Typical computing environment mapped to the ISMM Model 
Maturity at a given ISMM layer is reached by implementing quality prevention, detection, and recovery 
security controls on that layer and its preceding layers. Therefore, quality can be achieved at control level 
while maturity is achieved at various layers of the model. Table  3-3 provides different representations 
(say dashboards) of the information that details every control, its ISMM model properties, and resource 
usage. Similar types of these representations are used in other models explained earlier such as Security 
Program Maturity Model [53].  
Controls-specific ISMM-specific Resources-specific 


















            
            
            
            
            
Table  3-3: Simulated example showing controls-specific, ISMM-specific, and resource-specific 
parameters 
Table  3-4 and Table  3-5 depict the analysis of the organizational information security and maps it to 
security processes and quality respectively. Table  3-6 shows security posture in a more modular 
representation, say by site or department level. Maturity and quality are reflected separately as they 
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should always be. Note that these different tables and other diagrams may be taken at different times in 
order to measure progress against certain time. Resources (such as memory, processing power, and power 
energy) are always limited and hence are integrated into the whole evaluation process. The ISMM model 
is simply repeatable, its measures are suggested and judged against their logical order, moreover, 
integrated and mapped to network models. 
Layers 
Processes 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Prevention       
Detection       
Recovery       
Total       
Table  3-4: Dashboard of the ISMM layers and corresponding processes 
Layers 
Quality 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
None       
Low       
Med       
High       
Total       
Table  3-5: Dashboard of the ISMM layers and corresponding quality measures 
Layers 
Site/Branch/Department 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Maturity Average Quality 
A         
B         
…         
Total         
Table  3-6: Management dashboard of an aggregation of the ISMM layers, maturity levels, and 
quality 
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3.7 ISMM Differentiating Features 
According to [65], enterprises that expressed confidence in their security practices were in fact more 
secure, this was referred to as “confidence correlation”. Such confidence results in a virtuous cycle that 
spreads into the enterprise and leads to continuous support and improvements. The ISMM model 
acknowledges such correlation resulted from synergies of its three dimensions (people, process, and 
layering) where confidence is manifested in people, as security needs starting at lower levels lead to 
motivation, practices, then confidence and trust as a resultant and accumulated feeling of being more 
secure as we go up the hierarchy. 
The results of the Global Information Security Survey in 2004 suggest that most of the organizations 
are not well structured in terms of their security investment or practices: 
Quite a few organizations aren’t ‘doing security right’. It is a 
combination of a failure to invest and a failure to enforce…many 
organizations should not feel comfortable and secure, since they neither 
know themselves nor their enemies very well. [66]
This survey observation is based on the linkage with the work of Sun Tzu, The Art of War, which was 
written during the 6th century BC. Sun Tzu work is relevant and still has an influence on an organization 
effort to effectively protect itself against security threats [66]. 
Know the enemy and know yourself, in a hundred battles you will never 
be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your 
chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy 
and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.  [67]
The ISMM is neither derived from the perspective of security as a closed lifecycle, nor from only the 
attacker’s or defender’s (security professional) point of view, it is actually rather derived from the 
battlefield between both parties (i.e. attacker and defender at same time). Hence, it reflects conceptual and 
yet logical security boundaries, signifies rational security priorities, and captures commonsensical 
synergies between logical and physical security. Therefore, it offers unambiguous realization of the 
organization’s security level, and a better vehicle to study enemy’s capabilities at separate layers and in 
whole system as one integrated entity against both single and hybrid attacks. 
The ISMM model is deemed compatible and consistent with other security-related models and systems 
architecture. To mention some examples, it can be mapped to operating system security models, trust 
models, and mobile and wireless computing architectures, as the issues of physical security and resource 
scarceness that constitute major concerns for these models are already captured by the ISMM model. 
Regardless of the size or type of the environment or computing system under study, the ISMM provides 
a logical abstract of two sides of information security, these are: 
First: It abstracts the conceptual boundaries of information security into five specific, ordered, and 
related layers. These layers capture both technical and social aspects of any security implementation and 
also reflect the unavoidable interdependencies between physical and cyber security. Furthermore, 
Security controls are always classified in terms of their main functions as prevention, detection, or 
recovery controls. 
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Second: It also abstracts the totals of resources used for security controls (i.e. memory, processing 
power, energy, effort, and cost), such resources are further bonded to their respective ISMM-specific 
properties (security level, process, quality, and ISO17799) and control-specific properties (parameters and 
risks). These figures offer a richer picture of total investment on information security and progress against 
time, leading to a more justified estimate and guidance towards Return On Information (ROI). 
Such abstraction opens several new extensions of the model. It can be used as a solid ground for 
deriving following several major aspects in information security: 
First: A new definition of the notion optimally secure environment or system is suggested, which is tied 
to these conceptual layers and resource ratios. 
Second: An introduction towards developing an optimization formula for finding the best utilization 
ratio of various resources (i.e. memory, CPU, energy) in order to reach the desired (or maximum 
achievable) security level from the perspective of the ISMM abstracted layers. The formula shall capture 
both the original (i.e. existing) and optimized distribution of these resources and therefore shall have both 
lower and upper bounds of such usage. 
Third, a new attack model is proposed that is consistent with the original ISMM defense model and 
categorizes different attacks in such away that facilitates a new structured approach towards the analysis 
of their impacts. 
Additionally, the mapping of the ISMM model to network models (TCP/IP or ISO/OSI) suggests that 
security parameters and functions implemented into these networking layers can be further studied and 
analyzed in terms of their contribution to the security posture (on various layers of the ISMM) and 
consumptions of available resources. 
3.8  Summary 
As mentioned in [65], there are six secrets of highly secure organizations as a result of a review of the 
2004 Global Information Security Survey (more than 8,000 respondents from 62 countries), organizations 
were advised to: 
1. Spend more 
2. Separate information security from IT 
3. Conduct a penetration test 
4. Create a comprehensive risk assessment process 
5. Define overall security architecture 
6. Establish a quarterly review process 
Obviously, these advices are facilitated and made a lot clearer from the ISMM model perspective. The 
ISMM model abstracts security controls, resources and security boundaries from other elements including 
IT. The model captures the logical integration between physical and cyber security into one approach 
leading to richer view of the overall security architecture in place and, hence, facilitates more efficient 
risk assessment, auditing and penetration tests over information security. The model can also provide a 
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variety of security posture snapshots at different times, leading to a more structured realization of 
progress and spending against time for the quarterly review process. 
The suggested new definition of optimal security is derived from the abstraction of the ISMM at both 
conceptual security boundaries and resources. This bound provides a delimiter of various security levels. 
It puts optimal security into a new context that is measurable, auditable, repeatable, and yet simple. 
Furthermore, the suggested new ISMM Attack Model offers another tool for classifying attacks in terms 
of their breaches and impact caused. Such approach leads to a consistent view of weaknesses from sides: 
defense-in-depth and attack-in-depth. 
The ISMM model can be applied to different types of organizations while producing consistent results. 
Having or losing security will always be a comprised figure on something else, it must have a cost, the 
real art then is to optimize that cost for maximum return. In other words, it is an optimization problem 
that aims to find the right tradeoff between security needs, controls, and investment. Such approach shall 
lead to better realize the security into perspective and avoid the illusion of security. 
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Chapter 4 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
4.1 Introduction 
Organizations are globalizing and expanding their business operations, hence, facing the ever-growing 
risk interdependencies: 
Today’s huge opportunity can quickly become tomorrow’s nightmare - 
particularly if the nightmare involves loss or corruption of company 
information, theft of trade secrets, exposure of customer information, or 
infiltration of systems. [68]
Almost 80% of participants in Global Information Security Survey in 2006 agreed that efforts and 
activities to achieve regulatory compliance have improved their companies’ information security and 
think of it as a vehicle to address security issues including controls and processes proactively. 
The results of Global Information Security Survey, utilizing ISO17799-besd questionnaire and 
participants from nearly 1,200 organizations in 48 countries from around the world, have identified five 
global priorities for information security that will have a significant impact on organizations’ capacity to 
manage their risks and, eventually, on their success [68]. These five priorities are: 
• Integrating information security with the organization culture and overall risk management 
• Extending the impact of compliance as it promotes teaming with other business functions and 
hence improves information security 
• Managing the risks of third party relationships due to the impact of globalized business 
environments and resulted risk interdependencies  
• Formalizing privacy and personal data protection practices 
• Building and standardizing information security architecture and alignment with business goals 
The importance of these trends is increasing due to current globalized environments and extended 
business operations. The ISMM coincides with this orientation and can be used as a vehicle toward 
achieving such trends. Especially the integration of information security functions with other functions, 
compliance requirements, and managing organizational risk interdependencies. This is achieved because 
the ISMM measures security itself (actual delivery) regardless of the size or type of the organization 
under study, and hence, its certification mechanism goes beyond measuring the way security is governed 
(its process), and yet the ISMM is simple so that it can be understood and communicated easily at various 
organizational levels.  
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4.2 Research Conclusions 
While successful delivery of information security systems offers many advantages, including enhanced 
efficiency and effectiveness of operations, failure to successfully deliver information security is costly in 
monetary terms and also in personnel and organisational terms. In spite of all the investment in ICT and 
the increasingly important strategic role of ICT in the organisation, how to deliver information security 
successfully remains a challenge. 
Obviously, current information security industry has witnessed several auditing and monitoring models 
and tools. However, due to the evolving dynamics and complexity of current attacks and associated risks, 
there is a vital need for an adaptive maturity model that captures the convergence of both physical and 
cyber security into one multi-layer framework, that is neither tied up to a specific technology/protocol 
(e.g. PKI, IPSec, SSL) nor a certain system/product (e.g. Firewall, Antivirus, IDS). The ISMM, as a 
complement contribution to existing models and technologies, offers a methodology that guides toward 
an evolution path from an ad-hoc information security delivery approach into a  more structured, flexible, 
scalable, repeatable, and yet simple one. 
This research used a heuristics-based investigation of security-related models in general and the ISMM 
model in specific including all its properties: the three dimensions, propositions and dependencies. 
Consequently, introduces new extensions that are believed to facilitate various applications such as a 
method to abstract the amount of information security cost in a given communication device or 
computing environment, provides a measure of relative resources utilization against respective security 
controls and the ISMM layers, and abstracts optimal security notion and attacks in terms of their 
associated impact. Furthermore, a possible mapping of the ISMM to network models (ISO/OSI and 
TCP/IP) is demonstrated as an example of its consistency with other security-related models. 
These enhancements are believed to fill a gap in existing literature and industry practices regarding 
information security implementation. It can be concluded that this model presents a framework to assess 
and evaluate the quality of the deployed information security system, measures amount of information 
security cost, guides to the right layers and resource amounts of implementing security. Hence, assists to 
structure thoughts and realize actual information security posture progressively. 
4.3 Contribution to Knowledge 
In an attempt to provide tools for both practitioners and researchers by which they might devise schemes 
to increase the likelihood of information security implementation success, the researcher undertook a 
holistic approach in enhancing and extending the multi-layer, process-based Information Security 
Maturity Model, ISMM, in order to facilitate a vehicle that merit further applications and research 
endeavours. 
The researcher anticipates that the deployment of the ISMM model will enhance understanding the 
information security awareness and practice and thereby create an environment of a higher rate of success 
in ICT implementation. 
This research meets an identified research need into the information security engineering discipline, 
mainly the maturity models of information security. Contributions to the existing body of knowledge 
include enhancements and extensions of the Information Security Maturity Model (ISMM) as described 
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in the literature and a bridge between the literary and theory to the identification and use of the model in 
real-world situations. Significant contributions include the following points: 
• Literature review and discussion of existing security models in light of internationally 
recognized standards (i.e. ISO17799). This review is supported by introducing a new 
categorization of these models as follows: 
o Best practices oriented (such as BS7799, ISO17799, ISO27001) 
o Process oriented (such as SSE-CMM, ISM3, COBIT, NIST) 
o Risk oriented (such as CRAMM, OCTAVE) 
o Controls oriented (such as SPMM) 
o Security oriented (such as ISMM) 
• Abstracts information security cost and its conceptual boundaries into five specific, ordered, 
and still related layers, and captures both technical and social aspects of any security 
implementation. Additionally, acknowledges the unavoidable interdependencies between 
physical and cyber security 
• Abstracts totals of resources utilization for security controls (i.e. memory, processing power, 
energy, effort, and cost), and links them to model properties (i.e. security level, process, 
quality, and ISO17799) and control properties (i.e. parameters and risks). These figures offer 
additional information about security posture, and lead to a justified guidance towards 
information security direction and realization of Return On Information (ROI) 
• Suggests a definition of what an optimal security notion might mean, besides a new consistent 
attack model that is independent from any attack and size or type of the victim’s computing 
device or environment 
• Depicts an example of one possible mapping of the ISMM to other security-related models 
(through the use of network models) 
• Offers a useful and comprehensive tool to measure security level of any computing 
environment in a consistent way, facilitates various applications such as comparing security 
levels of different organizations for various business endeavors (such as certification, 
partnership, e-commerce, and networking) 
• Presents a convenient approach to measure investment on information security 
4.4 Further Research Questions 
Many questions were raised during this study that merit further investigation. The research has 
highlighted the lack of comprehensive maturity models that benefit both researchers and practitioners 
toward proper and structured understanding and implementation of such an important issue, the 
information security, as it is being recognised and paid attention more than ever. It is recommended that 
future work on this model could tackle the following issues: 
• How to apply this model in real life examples? Will it be possible to be implemented on some 
case studies? 
55 
• What is the optimized distribution or formula of the usage of various resources, including 
computational power, energy, and memory, beside other investments, for a given computing 
device or environment? Can this formula be further analyzed as an optimization problem from 
the ISMM abstraction of both conceptual boundaries and amount of information security cost? 
In the other words, where does the balance lie? 
• Can this formula be generalized to be applied on networking models (ISO/OSI and TCP/IP)? 
• Can these abstractions of security boundaries, costs, and attacks lead to formulate a measure of 
the “amount of information security” in place? 
• Can the ISMM research components be further extended to evaluate not only who deploys 
security controls, but who develops them and who drives them? As the behavioural 
characteristics of the organisations and the groups within them are necessary to the results and 
right use of these security models 
4.5 Summary 
Security is a costly element but the cost of losing it is much more. Besides saving informational assets, 
structured security implementation adds a unique and competitive advantage to the computing 
environment. As a result, the enhancement of such a holistic and integrative framework was a necessary 
step for both researchers and practitioners. 
The ISMM model along with its extensions described in this research meets that need. It provides a 
workable and reliable way to gather, map, and analyse data regarding the whole of the information 
security implementation/delivery landscape. The ISMM model can be applied at both the macro and 
micro level of any computing element, it can be applied on the computing environment under study as a 
whole and also can be brought down to the detailed level of security controls and associated parameters in 
every layer of the ISMM and networking models. 
The extended definitions of the ISMM components along with the abstraction provided of security 
conceptual boundaries and amount of information security cost, suggested optimal security definition, 
attack model, and mapping to network models are meant to be consistent in nature, integrated, and logical 
contributions to the mosaic of information security. 
Further research into any of the areas mentioned above will also be facilitated by these extensions. It is 





ISO and IEC form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. International Standard ISO/IEC 
17799 was originally prepared by the British Standards Institution under the name BS7799, and then 
adopted by ISO/IEC as ISO17799. ISO/IEC 17799 outlines ten (recently eleven domains) distinctive 
information security controls [31, 61]: 
Extracts from British Standards are reproduced with the permission of BSI under license number 
2006JK0018. 
1. Information security policy: 
The objective of this control is to have a documented information security policy, which is approved by 
the management and communicated to all intended employees. The policy should be reviewed regularly, 
and should always reflect all changes to ensure its consistency. 
2. Organizational security: 
This domain consists of three parts which are: 
a. Information security infrastructure: 
The objective of this control is to manage information security within the organization. There should be a 
management information security forum to ensure the availability and visibility of clear management 
commitment and support for security initiatives.  
b. Security of third-party access: 
The objective of this control is to maintain the security of organizational information processing facilities 
and information assets accessed by third parties. The associated risks shall be assessed and appropriate 
security controls implemented.  
c. Outsourcing: 
The objective of this control is to maintain the security of information when the responsibility for 
information processing has been outsourced to another organization. 
3. Asset classification and control: 
This domain consists of two parts which are: 
a. Accountability for assets: 
The objective of this control is to maintain appropriate protection of organizational assets. An inventory 
of all important assets associated with each information system shall be drawn up and maintained. 
b. Information classification: 
The objective of this control is to ensure that information assets receive an appropriate level of protection. 
Classifications and associated protective controls for information shall take account of business needs for 
sharing or restricting information, and the business impacts associated with such needs.  
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4. Personnel security: 
This domain consists of three parts which are: 
a. Security in job definition and resourcing: 
The objective of this control is to reduce the risks of human error, theft, fraud or misuse of facilities. 
Security roles and responsibilities, as laid down in the organization’s information security policy, shall be 
documented in job definitions.  
b. User training: 
The objective of this control is to ensure that users (could be employees or third-party) are aware of 
information security threats and concerns, and are equipped to support organizational security policy in 
the course of their normal work.  
c. Responding to security incidents and malfunctions: 
The objective of this control is to minimize the damage from security incidents and malfunctions, and to 
monitor and learn from such incidents. Security incidents shall be reported through appropriate 
management channels as quickly as possible.   
5. Physical and environmental security: 
This domain consists of three parts which are: 
a. Secure areas: 
The objective of this control is to prevent unauthorized physical access, damage and interference to 
business premises and information.  
b. Equipment security: 
The objective of this control is to prevent loss, damage or compromise of assets and interruption to 
business activities. Equipment shall be sited or protected to reduce the risks from environmental threats 
and hazards. 
c. General controls: 
The objective of this control is to prevent compromise or theft of information and information processing 
facilities. Organizations shall have a clear desk and a clear screen policy aimed at reducing the risks of 
unauthorized access, loss of, and damage to information.  
6. Communications and operations management: 
This domain consists of seven parts which are: 
a. Operational procedures and responsibilities: 
The objective is to ensure the correct and secure operation of information processing facilities.  
b. System planning and acceptance: 
The objective is to minimize the risk of systems failure. Capacity demands shall be monitored and 
projections of future capacity requirements made to enable adequate processing power and storage to be 
made available. 
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c. Protection against malicious software:  
The objective of this control is to protect the integrity of software and information from damage by 
malicious software (detection and prevention controls). 
d. Housekeeping: 
The objective of this control is to maintain the integrity and availability of information processing and 
communication services (back-up copies).  
e. Network management: 
The control objective is to ensure the safeguarding of information in networks and the protection of the 
supporting infrastructure. 
f. Media handling and security: 
The objective is to prevent damage to assets and interruptions to business activities. The management and 
disposal of media (i.e. tapes, disks) when no longer required. 
g. Exchanges of information and software: 
The control objective is to prevent loss, modification or misuse of information exchanged between 
organizations. 
7. Access Control: 
This domain consists of eight parts which are: 
a. Business requirement for access control: 
The objective is to control access to information. Business requirements for access control shall be 
defined and documented, and access shall be restricted to what is defined in the access control policy. 
b. User access management: 
The objective is to ensure that access rights to information systems are appropriately authorized, allocated 
and maintained. 
c. User responsibilities: 
The objective of this control is to prevent unauthorized user access. 
d. Network access control: 
The objective of this control is protection of networked services. Users shall only have direct access to the 
services that they have been specifically authorized to use. 
e. Operating system access control: 
The objective of this control is to prevent unauthorized computer access.  
f. Application access control: 
The objective of this control is to prevent unauthorized access to information held in information systems. 
g. Monitoring system access and use: 
The objective of this control is to detect unauthorized activities (i.e. audit logs).  
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h. Mobile computing and teleworking: 
The objective of this control is to ensure information security when using mobile computing and 
teleworking facilities. 
8. System development and maintenance: 
This domain consists of five parts which are: 
a. Security requirements of systems : 
The objective of this control is to ensure that security is built into information systems. 
b. Security in application systems: 
The objective of this control is to prevent loss, modification or misuse of user data in application systems. 
c. Cryptographic controls: 
The objective of this control is to protect the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of information. 
Encryption shall be applied to protect the confidentiality of sensitive or critical information. Digital 
signatures shall be applied to protect the authenticity and integrity of electronic information. Non-
repudiation services shall be used to resolve disputes about occurrence or non-occurrence of an event or 
action.  A key management system based on an agreed set of standards, procedures and methods shall be 
used. 
d. Security of system files: 
The objective of this control is to ensure that IT projects and support activities are conducted in a secure 
manner. 
e. Security in development and support processes: 
The objective is to maintain the security of application system software and information. The 
implementation of changes shall be strictly controlled by the use of formal change control procedures.  
9. Business continuity management: 
The objective of this control is to counteract interruptions to business activities and to protect critical 
business processes from the effects of major failures or disasters. 
10. Compliance: 
This domain consists of three parts which are: 
a. Compliance with legal requirements: 
The objective of this control is to avoid breaches of any criminal and civil law, statutory, regulatory or 
contractual obligations and of any security requirements.  
b. Reviews of security policy and technical compliance: 
The objective of this control is to ensure compliance of systems with organizational security policies and 
standards.  
c. System audit considerations: 




Part I: General Information 
• Check appropriate number 
• When using Microsoft Word, Double click the Checkbox field and select Checked in order to be set 
 
 
1. Your name and location (optional):  
 
2. What best describes the size of your company in term of number of employees: 
 Less than 50 employees    between 50 and 100 employees  
 Between 100 and 500 employees   between 500 and 1000 employees  
 Between 1000 and 5000 employees    more than 5000 employees 
  
3. Date of organization establishment:  
 Before 1980   between 1980 and 1990    After 1990  
 
4. Nature of business (check each one that applies): 
 Industrial   Services   Diversified   Trading 
 Banking   Contracting   Government   Others (specify): 
 
5. Organization overall annual budget (in Saudi Riyals): 
 Less than 5 million    between 5 and 10 million  
 Between 10 and 20 million   between 20 and 50 million   
 Between 50 and 100 million    Above 100 million 
 
6. IT department budget in relation to overall annual budget: 
Less than 5%    Between 5% and 10%  
 Between 10% and 20%   More than 20% 
 
7. Information security budget in relation to overall IT department budget: 
 Less than 5%    Between 5% and 10%  
 Between 10% and 20%   More than 20% 
 
8. Organization profit in relation to overall organization budget: 
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 Less than 5%    Between 5% and 10%  
 Between 10% and 20%   Between 20% and 30% 
 Between 30% and 40%   More than 40%  N/A or Non-profit 
 
9. Number of computers (either PCs or Workstations) in your organization: 
 Less than 100     between 100 and 500  
 Between 500 and 1000    more than 1000 
 
Part II: Physical and Environmental Security 
• Check appropriate number 
• Use following key: 
5= Rigorous and complete 
4= Complete 
3= In part 
2= Patchy  
1= Poor 
0= None, not known, or not applicable 
 
Definition: The control at this level aims at preventing unauthorized physical access or interference to IT 
environment or computer equipments and information assets. Physical security of IT department and having 
restricted access control to operation room are clear examples at this level. 
 
 
10. Are there a current, documented security policies and procedures which define all security physical 
access requirements to the facility including vendors and support personnel?  
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
11. Are all IT equipments and information processing facilities in areas protected from unauthorized 
physical access? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
12. Is there a legally approved scheme to detect any access violation to secure areas (e.g. using 24/7 
recording cameras and other monitoring systems)? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
13. How do you rate the overall classification and control of business assets? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
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14. Is there a current, documented, and tested recovery plan in case of physical security counter measures 
fail? 
 5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
15. Is there a current, documented, and tested emergency plan (evacuation) in case of environmental 
disaster occurs (e.g. fire)? 
 5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
16. Is preventive maintenance of all hardware equipments (mainframes, if applicable, PC’s, 
Routers, LAN’s, etc.) performed according to published schedules?  
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
17. Among following list, check tool(s) or mechanism(s) used for prevention and detection of any 







Others (please specify): 
 
Part III: Front-end System Security 
• Check appropriate number  
• Use same previous key 
 
Definition: Front-end system security is about all application level system functions and integrity requirements 
between the application itself and end-user interface, it suggests that application data should be protected against 
any potential threat that might cause loss, damage, or unauthorized access by either internal or external users. 
Application change management process and application authorization controls are just examples of what could fall 
in this section. 
 
 
18. Is a structured change management process for all application related development cycle 
issues in place? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
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19. Is there a clear, updated user’s manual that details proper usage of application? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
20. Are appropriate policies and procedures relating to software licensing, development, selection, 
specification, acquisition, testing, introduction, migration & disposal in place? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
21. Is application designed in such away that grants access permissions to only authorised users 
on the need basis for particular application functions? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
22. Are appropriate measures and controls that prevent users installing and using unauthorized software 
in place? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
23. If you have an externally accessible Web Server, are access controls implemented for the files and 
directories that are stored on the Web server? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
24. Are backup and recovery policies and procedures documented, tested, and updated regularly for all 
application level data? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
25. Do authorized individuals use their privileged accounts only for the tasks for which they are needed 
and use their unprivileged accounts for all other normal business activities? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
26. Are appropriate procedures in place to ensure that the passwords and privileges of terminated 
employees and contractors are immediately revoked? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
27. How well application level security issues are monitored and investigated regularly by 
security officer(s)? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
28. Is removable media containing sensitive information properly labelled and protected against 
unauthorized access at all times? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
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29. Are software audit tools in place to detect any unauthorized access, change, or removal of data, which 
will assist in post analysis and system corrections? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
 
Part IV: Back-end System Security 
• Check appropriate number 
• Use same previous key 
 
Definition: Back-end system security includes any resource (e.g. hardware, software, etc.) that are beyond 
application level components. Underlying network infrastructure and internal and external communication 
constitute the major components at this level. Examples are configuration of back-end platforms, intrusions 
detection systems, firewalls, and deployed cryptographic mechanism. 
 
 
30. Are there documented operating procedures for security requirements and access control of all 
networks, mission critical systems and their components that control access (e.g. firewalls, routers, web 
servers, application servers, etc.)? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
31. Are appropriate multi-layer defense controls used to prevent unauthorized access on all connections 
between internal networks and systems and external networks, such as vendor’s systems or the internet? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
32. Is there an enforced separation of duties in all critical process steps for all security sensitive 
operations? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
33. Is all sensitive information encrypted properly whenever it is stored or transmitted over all networks 
(either internally or externally)? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
34. How well are prevention and detection systems (e.g. Antivirus, Firewalls, IDS) are deployed and 
monitored? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
35. How well do you feel the encryption keys are always safe from any accidental or intentional key 
compromise? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
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36. Are backup and recovery policies and procedures documented, tested, and updated regularly for all 
back-end mission critical systems? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
37. How reliable is deployed security system monitors and responds to any networks intrusions, 
vulnerabilities, hacking or any irregularities behaviors on 24/7 basis? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
38. Are there fault tolerant or redundant components that control access to the company's trusted systems 
to and from all external networks (e.g. redundant firewalls, routers, web servers, application servers, 
etc.)? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
 
Part V: Comprehensive Security Awareness 
• Check appropriate number 
• Use same previous key 
 
Definition: Security awareness requirements are identified and affected by people.  Expenditure on security 
awareness programs needs to be balanced against the business harm likely to result from people awareness failures, 
therefore, this level suggests that the scope of security awareness includes the whole of the organisation staff and 
encapsulates the practice of deployed security controls. 
 
 
39. Has the organization developed and communicated, as appropriate, to all employees a written 
information technology security policy that complies with international standards such as 
ISO/IEC 17799? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
40. Is security awareness training program (formal or informal) conducted prior to users 
receiving access to an application? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
41. Are employees, consultants and contract personnel informed about the importance of security and the 
proper process for reporting suspected security incidents? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
42. If you had a security breach today, are you likely know or be made aware immediately? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
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43. To what extent do you rate that employees have a clear understanding of their roles and 
responsibilities relating to information security? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
44. Are information security policies and procedures cover all lower levels requirements mentioned 
earlier (physical and environmental, front-end system, and back-end system)? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
45. How well do you feel that your business data is always safe from accidental or malicious corruption, 
copying, theft or tampering? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
46. Do you have documented, tested, and updated regularly contingency plans for all lower levels 
systems' failure (physical and environmental, front-end system, and back-end system requirements)? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
47. Are all security relevant actions on all lower levels systems requirements (physical and 
environmental, front-end system, and back-end system) controlled and logged? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
48. As part of the hiring/contracting process, are applicants for system administration, security 
administration, sensitive programming, and other positions requiring high level access to mission critical 
systems subject to background checks with law enforcement authorities (and government agencies if 
warranted)? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
49. Are all sensitive security logs reviewed at least daily for suspicious activities? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
50. Are the employees, designated to respond to suspected intrusions, trained in the handling of forensic 
evidence, law enforcement involvement and press relations? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
51. Are there comprehensive penetration tests conducted regularly to verify the security of the whole 
company's perimeter which covers all lower levels requirements (physical and environmental, front-end, 
and back-end)? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
52. Are all resource procurements coordinated and approved by a centralized authority to ensure 
compliance with existing standards, including IT security standards/requirements? 
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5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
53. Is a documented organization-wide approach for risk assessment and management in place? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
54. Does a security policy review take place in response to any changes affecting the basis of the original 
risk assessment e.g. significant security incidents, new vulnerabilities or changes to the organizational or 
technical infrastructure? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
55. Are IT assets, their ownership and agreed security classification (such as paper, expertise, electronic, 
etc.) clearly identified and regularly reviewed? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
56. To avoid breaches of any criminal and civil law, are all relevant statutory, regulatory and contractual 
requirements being explicitly defined and documented for each information system? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
57. Does your company have formal privacy policy that has been approved by legal counsel and 
communicated to all employees? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
Part VI: Definite Security: 
• Check appropriate number 
• Use same previous key 
 
Definition: Security measurement is always a subjective rather than objective issue. Definite security could be a 
virtual feeling but in reality, it can never been fulfilled completely (i.e. reaches one hundred percent) since security 
in general is a continuous process and associated with emotions. There is no denying that there is no such system 
that is absolutely secured since there is no full proof "silver bullet" security solution. However, there are many 
systems that are rated as highly secured ones, and designed in such a way so that they almost can detect, and 
recover from incidents immediately. 
 
 
58. To what extent do you feel physical and environmental security requirements are ultimate and totally 
complete? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
59. To what extent do you feel front-end system security requirements are ultimate and totally complete? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
60. To what extent do you feel back-end system security requirements are ultimate and totally complete? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
61. To what extent do you feel security awareness requirements are ultimate and totally complete? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
62. Would your company resume business and recover immediately from any major disaster such as 
earthquake or big fire? 
5  4  3  2  1  0  
 
63. From the list of factors which might prevent a rigorous and complete implementation of overall 









Others (please specify): 
 





CMIP: Common Management Information Protocol 
FTAM: File Transfer Access and Management 
VTP: ISO Virtual Terminal Protocol 
RTSE: Reliable Transfer Service Element Protocol 
X.400: Message Handling Service (ISO email transmission service) Protocols 
X.500: Directory Access Service Protocol (DAP) 
CONP: Connection-Oriented Network Protocol  
ES-IS: End System to Intermediate System Routing Exchange protocol  
IS-IS: Intermediate System to Intermediate System  
ISO-IP: CLNP: Connectionless Network Protocol 
IEEE 802.2: IEEE standard definition for Logical Link Control (LLC) 
IEEE 802.3: IEEE standards definition for physical layer and the media access control (MAC) sublayer of 
the data link layer of wired Ethernet 
IEEE 802.5: IBM Token Ring standard 
FDDI: Fiber-Distributed Data Interface standard 
X.25: an ITU-T standard protocol suite for wide area networks using the phone or ISDN system as the 
networking hardware. It defines standard physical layer, data link layer and network layers (layers 1 
through 3) of the OSI model 
IEEE: The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
SMTP: Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
FTP: File Transfer Protocol 
SSH: Secure Shell 
HTTP: Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
SSL: Secure Sockets Layer 
TLS: Transport Layer Security 
TCP: Transmission Control Protocol 
UDP: User Datagram Protocol 
RSVP: Resource reservation protocol 
DCCP: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol 
IP (IPv4, IPv6): Internet Protocol (version 4, version 6) 
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ICMP: Internet Control Message Protocol 
IGMP: Internet Group Management Protocol 
ARP: Address Resolution Protocol 
PPP: Point-to-Point Protocol 
ATM: Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
GPRS: General Packet Radio Services 
ISDN: Integrated Services Digital Network 
USB: Universal Serial Bus 
GSM: Global System for Mobile Communications 
PKI: Public Key Infrastructure 
RSA: an algorithm named after Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman 
Diffie-Hellman: a key exchange cryptographic protocol 
DSA: Digital Signature Algorithm 
RC4: Ron's Code or Rivest Cipher 4, is a software-based stream cipher 
IDEA: International Data Encryption Algorithm , a block cipher 
Triple DES: formed from the Data Encryption Standard (DES) cipher by using it three times, a block 
cipher 
AES: Advanced Encryption Standard, a block cipher 
MD5: Message-Digest algorithm 5, a 128-bit cryptographic hash function 
SHA: Secure Hash Algorithm, denoted SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512, are 
cryptographic hash functions 
ECC: Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
ECDH: Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman 
ECDSA: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
CCTV: Closed-Circuit Television 
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